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ABSTRACT
Platforms are the critical players driving the digital economy. My thesis focuses on the
platform economy, especially the competitive advantage of platforms. On the one hand,
what factors affect the competitive advantage of platforms? How does the platform form
the competitive advantage? These questions are related to platform strategy. On the other
hand, does the competitive advantage of platforms harm social welfare? This question is
related to regulatory issues.
The first chapter 1 of my dissertation studies how different aspects of user effects drive
value in two-sided markets. We first develop a model of inter-temporal network effects
and within-period network effects of users to estimate different aspects of user effects. We
then propose a model to estimate the user lifetime value in two-sided markets and examine
the effectiveness of the user growth strategy. Finally, we discuss platform heterogeneity
and corresponding platform strategies. Using Groupon data, we empirically estimate dif-
ferent aspects of user effects and examine how they vary. We show that the strength of
the inter-temporal same-side network effect affects user stickiness, further influencing the
persistence of the within-period cross-side network effect. Strong within-period cross-side
network effects alone cannot sustain value creation. Our findings remind managers not to
1This chapter is a joint work with Lingling Zhang and Marshall Van Alstyne.
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overemphasize user growth when the inter-temporal network effects are weak and should
instead focus on platform design that increases user stickiness.
The second chapter 2 of my dissertation examines the impact of a potential policy of
opening a platform’s big data to banks on FinTech lending. We show that the policy pro-
motes competition in FinTech lending and the loan price decreases. However, its impact on
financial inclusion is unclear. We discuss how the efficiency of the banking system and the
value of big data affect the policy outcome. We also consider equilibrium of a data market
where the platform can sell big data to banks. We show that FinTech can best promote
financial inclusion in this case, but the loan price is the same as when the platform monop-
olizes big data. Since financial inclusion is important for entrepreneurship and innovation,
the regulator should carefully examine the context in their countries before making a policy
choice.
The third chapter 3 of my dissertation studies the impact of cross-market acquisitions
of giant platforms on start-ups’ entry into emerging markets. Our model shows that the ac-
quisition reduces the post-acquisition entry but may increase the pre-acquisition entry. The
net effect of the acquisition on the entry is positive when the pre-acquisition gain is greater
than the post-acquisition loss. We then discuss three cases in which a giant platform strate-
gically increases its market position in the acquisition. The net effect of the acquisition
on start-ups’ entry varies in different cases. Our findings indicate that regulators should
analyze the specific situation of each acquisition before making a decision to approve an
acquisition.
2This chapter is a joint work with Zhouxiang Shen.
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How Users Drive Value in Two-sided Markets: Platform Designs That Matter
1.1 INTRODUCTION
If the world’s first trillion-dollar businesses are platforms (Cusumano et al., 2020), why
may firms with strong network effects falter? It is popularized that stronger network effects
drive platforms toward winner-take-all markets (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Shapiro &
Varian, 1998; Schilling, 1999; Park, 2004; Dubé et al., 2010). This encourages platforms
to invest in user growth, hoping that a jump-start in user base can lead to persistent future
growth. In practice, however, platforms with large user bases have both succeeded and
failed (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; Hagiu & Rothman, 2016). Firms such as Apple,
Amazon, Google, and Facebook have grown large user bases, and with high margins and
market shares, their valuations have followed. On the other hand, platforms such as Uber,
DiDi, Lending Club, and Groupon have grown large user bases yet seen their valuations
fall. Venture capitalists have subsidized such firms despite an absence of profits, under the
belief that investing in user growth until network effects achieve critical mass can lead to
market dominance. However, the notion that success takes patient capital is sometimes
paid off and sometimes not. Central questions for researchers and practitioners are: How
do users drive value, and when is a user growth strategy effective? Answers these questions
have important managerial implications for both corporates and investors.
This research develops a model of inter-temporal network effects and within-period
network effects to explain how various network effects drive value. Built upon the dy-
namic two-sided models which classify the network effect into the cross-side network ef-
fect (CNE) and same-side network effect (SNE) (Chu & Manchanda, 2016), we systemat-
ically incorporate the time dimension and classify the network effects into four types: the
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within-period same-side network effect, the within-period cross-side network effect, the
inter-temporal same-side network effect, and the inter-temporal cross-side network effect.
The CNE corresponds to the cross-side user interactions and attraction on a platform, and
the user utility on one side increases with the size of users on the other side (Rochet &
Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). Extant literature models CNE as inter-temporal network
effect, which makes sense when users’ cost of switching platforms is high (Chu & Man-
chanda, 2016). In these markets, the previous network size affects users expectations of the
current network size. Most models of network effects are based on this expectation-driven
view (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). In this research, We argue
that, in many online markets, consumers can switch between platforms without much cost,
and consumers make decisions after observing the current size on the other side. For ex-
ample, on deal platforms, consumers can decide whether to participate after observing the
available deal offerings. Their purchase decision is directly affected by current merchant
base, rather than previous merchant base. Therefore, we model CNE as a within-period
effect and only include a within-period cross-side network effect (CNEt) in our model. The
SNE, including SNEt−1 and within-period same-side network effect, refers to how users di-
rectly affect those on the same side. The SNE is generated by social influence among users
in the form of word-of-mouth (WOM) or user-generated content (UGC). Extant research
has shown that reviews, ratings, and other UGC affect the attractiveness of a platform over
time (Dellarocas, 2003; Forman et al., 2008; Li et al., 2011). In several recent studies,
the SNE is modeled as a learning mechanism because the UGC sheds light on the quality
of products/services and thus reduces the uncertainty when current consumers are making
their purchase decisions (Hagiu & Wright, 2020a; Wu et al., 2015). Following Li et al.
(2017b), we reduced the time dimension of our regression model from monthly to weekly
and model SNE as an inter-temporal effect. With a much shorter period, the inter-temporal
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same-side network effects (SNEt−1) should dominate the within-period same-side network
effects.
By adding the time dynamics into network effects, our innovation better capture the
value creation of platform businesses. Our within-period network effects characterize con-
temporaneous user attraction as in the classic models of two-sided markets (Rochet & Ti-
role, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Armstrong, 2006). Our inter-temporal network
effects characterize user attraction across periods, and thus contribute to user stickiness.
We demonstrate that, without user stickiness, strong CNEt alone are insufficient to prosper
platform value creation.
Based on different network effects, we develop a model of customer lifetime value
(CLV ) in two-sided markets and examine the effectiveness of the user growth strategy. In
their classic work, Gupta et al. (2004) propose a model to estimate firm value based on
CLV for traditional pipeline businesses. Not accounting for network effects, traditional
CLV approach can substantially underestimate the value of platform firms such as Amazon
and eBay (Gupta & Mela, 2008; McCarthy & Fader, 2018).
In this research, we extend the CLV literature into two-sided markets. We propose a
network calculation of CLV that directly incorporates various network effects. Our ap-
proach relies on aggregate-level data and generates coefficient estimates using a regression
framework. This allows platforms to calculate the CLV for their users based on their ex-
isting data. We further demonstrate that, by comparing CLV and user acquisition cost, we
can examine the effectiveness of the user growth strategy. Our study is distinct from extant
studies that also addressed network effects (Tucker & Zhang, 2011; Chu & Manchanda,
2016; Li et al., 2020). Whereas those studies focus on choosing a preferred investment side
or within versus cross-category investment, our research explicitly provides a framework
that not only quantifies CLV for each side in a two-sided market but also sheds light on
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the relative contributions of network effects in boosting user value. This makes a compar-
ison of the impact of different strategies including user acquisition through marketing and
platform design feasible.
An interesting question to consider is why the effectiveness of a user growth strategy
varies by platforms with strong cross-side network effects. Our model implies that the CLV
is affected by the strength of both SNEt−1 and cross-side network effects, and the strength
of SNEt−1 could vary across platforms. In theory, UGC is more valuable for products with
higher uncertainty (Li et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2015; Li & Wu, 2018). Using Groupon data,
Li & Wu (2018) show that previous sales information has a greater impact on consumer
choices in the category of experience goods than search goods because experienced goods
are associated with higher uncertainty. In the same vein, we hypothesize that the SNEt−1
of experienced goods is stronger than that of search goods. Given the strength of CNEt ,
we simulate the impact of various SNEt−1 on CLV . Our simulation shows that a positive
SNEt−1 amplifies the impact of CNEt on CLV . In an extreme case when the SNEt−1 is
absent on the platform, the CNEt only creates value in one period, and the CLV is equal to
the value created in the current period. However, when the SNEt−1 exists, users continue
creating value in future periods.
Using data from Groupon, we empirically examine different aspects of network effects.
Our data are a market-level monthly panel and include variables such as the number of
consumers and merchants and deal characteristics. Identifying network effects is known to
be challenging because the choice of an individual depends on others’ choices in the net-
work, i.e., the reflection problem (Manski, 1993, 1999). For the SNEt−1, we leverage the
panel data structure and address this issue by modeling how the previous consumer base
and merchant base affect the future user base. For the CNEt , following Rysman (2019),
we identify the effects by leveraging different instrumental variables that affect only one
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side of the market but are exogenous to the other side. With these instruments, we specify
dynamic linear models and estimate the parameters using the generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimator. Various diagnostics analyses seek to confirm the validity of these
results.
Although our data set consists of just one platform, Groupon, we classify product cat-
egories on Groupon into experience goods and search goods and estimate different aspects
of network effects in a quasi multi-platform context. On the consumer side, the SNEt−1
is estimated to be positive and significant for experience goods but insignificant for search
goods. For both the experience goods and search goods, the CNEt of merchants on con-
sumers is estimated to be positive and significant. On the merchant side, the SNEt−1 and
CNEt are estimated to be positive and significant for both experience goods and search
goods, but the SNEt−1 for experience goods is found to be approximately 1.7 as large as
that for search goods while the CNEt is qualitatively similar between these two categories.
In sum, as hypothesized, the SNEt−1 presents heterogeneity between experience goods and
search goods, while the CNEt is qualitatively similar between the two categories.
Based on the parameter estimates, we estimate the CLV for experience goods and search
goods, respectively. Our analyses suggest that common marketing strategies that bring
users to a platform are not cost-effective, especially for the market of search goods. This
leads us to examine alternative strategies rather than buying users. Our simulation shows
that platform design that enhances user stickiness increase CLV . With increased user stick-
iness, user acquisition marketing becomes cost-effective. We discuss two platform design
choices to enhance user stickiness. First, the platform can devise methods to enhance user
participation (Huang et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2019), and the differences in user behav-
ior can drive differences in platform value (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Amazon was
among the first platforms to invest in recommender systems and UGC in order to make
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their undifferentiated books more valuable (Dellarocas, 2003). In SAP’s enterprise soft-
ware ecosystem, independent software vendors compete for contracts and may naturally
hide their expertise from one another. The design of SAP’s developer network, however,
rewards partners for sharing ideas and answering each other’s questions in a public fo-
rum. Participants increase each other’s sales at statistically significant levels (Ceccagnoli
et al., 2012). Airbnb’s host forum, likewise, helps hosts solve problems, deal with unruly
guests, and share tips for improved ratings (Hardy & Dolnicar, 2017). Second, platforms
can implement design choices to affect the user adoption decision and avoid disinterme-
diation (Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; Halaburda et al., 2016). For example, platforms can invest
in quality enhancement, such as improving the delivery system and merchant information
system to drive platform adoption. As users become stickier on the platform due to these
value-added services, the CLV will increase and thus user acquisition strategy can become
cost-effective.
This research contributes to both theory and practice. First, we develop a model of
inter-temporal network effects and within-period network effects to complement the static
and dynamic models of two-sided network effects in extant literature. Strong within-period
attraction does not necessarily imply strong inter-temporal attraction. When the inter-
temporal network effect is weak, the within-period network effect may not persist, and
a user growth strategy is not effective. Given the model, we further propose a framework
to estimate the CLV in two-sided markets. Existing CLV model does not capture the value
created through network effects and would underestimate the CLV of platforms such as
Amazon and eBay (Gupta et al., 2004). Our innovation extends the traditional CLV re-
search by incorporating different aspects of network effects into CLV calculation. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first study that proposes a theory-driven user value cal-
culation that can be easily adopted by practice. Using our model, platforms can calculate
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CLV using market-level data and evaluate the effectiveness of the user growth strategy.
Second, this is the first paper to empirically estimate different network effects and to
identify heterogeneous inter-temporal network effects across different product markets.
We show that the inter-temporal network effect is weaker for search goods than experi-
ence goods, yielding a less effective user growth strategy for search goods than experience
goods. Everything else being equal, the CLV is higher in product markets with higher inter-
temporal network effects. For markets with weak inter-temporal network effects, we show
that platform design interventions that enhance user stickiness can increase CLV , and then
a user growth strategy may become cost-effective. Overall, these findings remind platform
managers not to overemphasize user growth when user stickiness is poor, and, instead, to
focus on platform design that enhances user stickiness.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature. In Sec-
tion 3, we introduce our model. In Section 4, we describe our data set and identification
strategies. Section 5 presents our empirical findings. Then Section 6 presents an analysis
of platform strategic responses when the user stickiness is poor. In Section 7, we conclude
with a discussion of the implications of our findings, as well as future research directions.
1.2 RELATED LITERATURE
1.2.1 Static Models of Two-sided Markets
Static theoretical models have been developed to study the price structure in two-sided
markets (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; Armstrong, 2006). Empirical
works in this context focus on estimating the CNE and discussing its impact on market
surplus (Rysman, 2004). Due to the intrinsic dynamic nature of platform growth, however,
static models are insufficient for understanding the comprehensive effect of users on a
platform’s value. Our paper extends the two-sided network effects literature by adding
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the time dimension. We emphasize that the CNE do not naturally persist, and that the
persistence of CNE plays a critical role for the success of platforms’ user growth strategy.
This is in the same spirit as in McIntyre & Srinivasan (2017), which argued that little
empirical work has investigated the persistence of network effects over time. Many factors,
such as platform quality, affect users’ platform adoption choices, and thus the persistence
of network effects (Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; Halaburda et al., 2020). In this research, we control
other factors and focus on examining how the users themselves contribute to the persistence
of network effects.
1.2.2 Dynamic Models of Markets with Network Externalities
Network effects have attracted a long-standing interest in market evolution. The adoption
decision for future users is modeled as a function of their beliefs on expected network
size, which is assumed to be influenced by the previous network size (Katz & Shapiro,
1994; Shapiro & Varian, 1998; Farrell & Klemperer, 2007). The assumption that cross-side
network effects depend on user belief of network size is reasonable in the context where the
user switching cost is high. Platform research has already shown that switching cost is an
important determinant of user value (Farrell & Klemperer, 2007; Katz & Shapiro, 1985).
Nowadays, however, the user switching cost is trivial in online markets. Take retailing
platform for an example. Users can make the adoption decisions (i.e., whether or not being
an active participant) after observing the size of supply in each period. The possibility of
switching between platforms can dissipate rents and intensify competition (Rysman, 2009).
Therefore, a large supplier base in the previous period does not necessarily exert a network
effect on adoption decisions for the prospective users in the same way as defined in extant
research.
Another stream of empirical research in this domain estimated the magnitude of differ-
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ent cross-side network effects, for example, to what extent existing customers attract future
suppliers and vice versa. Using an online retailing platform, Chu & Manchanda (2016)
quantified the relative importance of one side over the other side of CNE. Li et al. (2020)
further studied user growth across multiple categories and across different time periods in
a two-sided market. Insights from these studies have implications on how to optimize the
investments in user growth conditional on the effectiveness of different cross-side network
effects. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that user stickiness on the
platform plays a critical role: when user stickiness is poor, no user growth strategies can
generate high returns on investment (ROI). Therefore, it may be not cost effective to in-
vest in either side or any categories of a platform. Rather, we suggest that platform should
improve design to enhance user stickiness. Our user-value strategy is particularly relevant
when the switching cost is trivial, as is the case on many digital platforms.
1.2.3 Platform Design
Parker et al. (2017) shows that firms are transiting from doing production themselves to
having external partners create value, as in the case of Uber and Amazon marketplace.
The design of network effects becomes particularly salient in this context (Schrage, 2012).
Different from these works, our paper underlines the importance of user stickiness. By
investing in the designs that can enhance user stickiness, each user’s value gets magni-
fied during platform’s growth path and the CLV is increased. Two types of strategies have
been proposed. First, platforms can make current users more valuable for future users.
This is consistent with the idea of “making consumers better to make better consumers”
(Schrage, 2012). As one example, Airbnb helped consumers take more attractive pho-
tos of their homes to increase bookings. Second, platforms can enhance network effects
through sustained resource commitment and architectural design (McIntyre & Subrama-
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niam, 2009), for example, giving away reference designs and system developer toolkits
(Boudreau, 2010), and opening application programming interfaces (Benzell et al., 2017).
These design choices are related to improving platform quality, and thereby enhance the
platform’s attractiveness to users, creating platform value (Tellis et al., 2009; Zhu & Iansiti,
2012).
1.2.4 Customer Lifetime Value
An important stream of research that is closely related to firm value is the concept of CLV in
marketing (Gupta et al., 2004; McCarthy & Fader, 2018). This line of research emphasizes
user stickiness and explicitly incorporates user retention in CLV calculation (Gupta et al.,
2004; Pfeifer & Farris, 2004; Gupta, 2005). However, extant literature has been largely re-
stricted to businesses without network externalities. Despite its popularity, the extant CLV
calculation is insufficient to estimate the true value of users on digital platforms. One pri-
mary objective of this research is that we explicitly model how network externalities create
value across multiple channels and thus extend the CLV framework to two-sided markets.
Furthermore, extant CLV research does not distinguish how different factors contribute to
user value. Following Zhang et al. (2012); Li et al. (2020), we control factors such as plat-
form quality and focus on analyzing how different types of network effects affect value
creation.
1.3 MODELING APPROACH
This section presents our model specification. First, we explain how different aspects of
network effects influence the dynamics of two-sided markets and specify a structural model
to study the users’ participation choices. Second, based on the estimates of different net-
work effects, we propose a framework to calculate the CLV in two-sided markets. We
11
discuss platform heterogeneity and demonstrate how the strength of SNEt−1 affects the
effectiveness of the user growth strategy.
1.3.1 Demand Dynamics in Two-sided Markets
Built upon the static model of Parker & Van Alstyne (2005) and the dynamic model of Chu
& Manchanda (2016), we incorporate the time dimension and study dynamics of two-sided
markets. Figure 1.1 describes the demand evolution on the two sides of a platform business,
which allows consumers (merchants) in the pervious period to influence consumers (mer-
chants) in the current period. To illustrate market evolution, consider a shock to consumer
base at t − 1 and its dynamic effect, as shown in Figure 1.1. First, the shock to consumer
base at t − 1 affects the consumer base at t via SNEt−1. Second, an increase in the cur-
rent consumer base would lead to growth in the current merchant base via the CNEt . The
prices and sizes of each user group combinedly determine the profit during each period in
the dynamic system. Here nt ,mt , pnt , p
m
t correspond to the consumer base, merchant base,
price for consumers, and price for merchants, respectively, in period t. The same logic ap-
plies to a shock to the merchant base. Next, we present how these different network effects
are modeled empirically. For exposition, we refer to the two sides as the "consumer side"
and "the merchant side", although our modeling framework can be applied to a two-sided
market beyond the retailing setting.
1.3.1.1 Consumer Side
On the consumer side, several factors jointly determine the utility that a representative
buyer i derives from using the platform in market j at time t. First, the utility is related to the
platform’s attractiveness, which is further decomposed into four components: (1) consumer
i′s intrinsic preference for the focal platform αnj (in subsequent analysis, superscript ’n’
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Figure 1.1: Dynamic Participation of Consumers (nt) and Merchants (mt) in Each
Period.
denotes the consumer side), which is assumed to be varying by market but constant over
time; (2) the number of consumers in the previous period n j,t−1, to capture SNEt−1 that
is attributable to word-of-mouth and UGC; (3) the number of merchants m jt , to capture
CNEt that is due to the amount of supply1; and (4) average price p jt and other product
characteristics X jt . Furthermore, the utility depends on (i) the attractiveness of the rival
platform R jt (Rochet & Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006), which includes rivals’ user base
in market j at t, ii) the macro-economic trends of the industry and seasonalities that are
common to all markets and unobserved to researchers T bt , (iii) the unobserved market and
time specific shocks to the demand ξnjt , and (iv) the idiosyncratic error ε
n
i jt . Formally, the
net indirect utility is specified as follows:
Uni jt = f (α
n







We assume that the utility takes the Cobb-Douglas form (Chu & Manchanda, 2016) and
1The lags of merchant base are excluded from Equation 1.2 because we model a setting with trivial
switching cost. In such a context, consumers make decisions after observing current supply on competing
platforms, and thus, they do not need to form expectations about current supply based on previous supply.
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rewrite the indirect net utility as:
uni jt = α
n
j +β1 lnn j,t−1 + γ1 lnm jt +ρ1 ln p jt +η1X jt






The inter-temporal and within-period network effect parameters are our primary interest
in Equation 1.2. We capture industry-level trend and seasonality using time fixed effects
T nt , which is more flexible than assuming a parametric form such as the linear or quadratic
specification. There are also market-specific demand shocks ξnjt that make the platform
more or less attractive across different markets over time. These shocks are observed by
platforms and users but unobserved to researchers, causing an endogeneity concern. All
other factors are absorbed in the idiosyncratic errors εni jt .




i jt and normalize the utility of the outside
option as zero, which corresponds to consumers choosing the rivals or not participating
in the market. Assuming that εni jt follows independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)















N jt −n jt
)
/N jt
= αnj +β1 lnn j,t−1 + γ1 lnm jt +ρ1 ln p jt +η1X jt




where sn0 jt is the market share of the outside option and N jt is the market size for buyers
in market j time t. Estimating the parameters of interest based on Equation 1.4 poses
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challenges due to endogeneity and market heterogeneity. We discuss our identification
strategy in detail in Section 1.6.
1.3.1.2 Merchant Side
The utility specification for the merchants is similar to that of the consumer side. For a rep-
resentative merchant (seller) l in market j at time t, its utility of working with the platform
is first related to the platform’s attractiveness: (1) merchants l′s preference for the focal
platform αmj (in subsequent analysis, superscript ’m’ denotes the merchant side), which is
assumed to be varying by market but constant over time; (2) the number of existing mer-
chants m j,t−1 to capture SNEt−1; (3)the number of current consumers n jt to capture CNEt ;
(4) product price Pl jt ; and (5) whether the merchant has experiences with the platform Xl jt ,
which captures the switching cost on the platform.
Note that the merchant base in the past, the SNEt−1, can affect the participation decision
for a current merchant for a couple of reasons. Existing merchants could create a word-
of-mouth effect, which helps the platform to attract new merchants. Too many merchants,
however, could increase competition and deter future entry, causing a negative same-side
network effect. Thus, the SNEt−1 on the merchant side could be positive or negative,
depending on which effect dominates. The CNEt from consumers to merchants is expected
to be positive, because more consumers would bring higher sales and profits, increasing the
attractiveness of the platform to merchants 2. For specific platforms such as Groupon, the
consumer base helps increase the consumer reach and awareness for the merchant’s brand,
creating a marketing effect (Dholakia, 2011; Edelman et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the CNEt
term in our model captures the cross-side effect of consumers on both the current profits
and future profits.
2Following Li et al. (2017b), the lags of the consumer base are excluded from Equation 1.5 because
merchants have correct expectations about future demand.
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The merchant’s utility further depends on (i) the attractiveness of the rival platform
R jt , (ii) the macro-economic trends of the industry that are common to all markets and
unobserved to researchers T mt , (iii) the unobserved market and time specific shocks to the
demand ξmjt , and (iv) the idiosyncratic error ε
m
l jt . Formally, the net indirect utility for a
merchant is specified as follows:
uml jt = α
m
j +β2 lnm j,t−1 + γ2 lnn jt +ρ2 ln pl jt +η2Xl jt






Following a similar step as for the consumer side, we denote the utility as uml jt = δ
m
jt +
εml jt and normalize the utility of outside option as zero. Assuming that ε
m
i jt is i.i.d. Type-I







M jt −m jt
)
/M jt
= αmj +β2 lnm j,t−1 + γ2 lnn jt +ρ2 ln p jt +η2X jt




where sm0 jt is the market share for merchants choosing the outside option and M jt is the
market size for potential merchants. Our estimation and identification strategy is discussed
in Section 1.6.
Table 1.1 provides a summary of all variable and parameter definitions used in our
model.
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Table 1.1: Variable and Parameter Definitions
Notation Definition Notation Definition
n consumer base β1, β2 SNEt−1
m merchant base γ1, γ2 CNEt
N consumer market size αnj ,α
m
j user preference
M merchant market size snjt ,s
m
jt market share
R rival user base and price θ1, θ2 competitive effect
p price ρ1, ρ2 price elasticity
X product features η1, η2 product attractiveness
T industry-level common trend ϕ1, ϕ2 time fixed effects
V user value ξnjt , ξ
m
jt unobserved shocks
1.3.2 Customer Lifetime Value in Two-sided Markets
In their classic work, Gupta et al. (2004) define the CLV of a consumer as the expected sum
of discounted future earnings. Following their definition, we propose a model to estimate
the CLV in two-sided markets. We assume a one-unit increase in the consumer base and
quantify the increase of user bases on both sides of the market. To compute the user value,
we transform the estimated elasticity of the market share into a marginal effect of the user
base using the standard relationship: ∆Y /∆X = Ȳ /X̄ ×∆ lnY /σlnX ×(1− s̄Y ), where sY is
the average market share of Y (Berry et al., 1995; Trusov et al., 2009). Thus, the marginal
effects of inter-temporal user attraction are β̃1 = β1 × (1− s̄n) and β̃2 = β2 × (1− s̄m),
and the marginal effects of within-period user attraction are γ̃1 = n̄m̄ × γ1 × (1− s̄
n) and
γ̃2 = m̄n̄ × γ2 × (1− s̄
m). The marginal effects of deal price on the consumer and merchant
bases are ρ̃1 = n̄p̄ ×ρ1 × (1− s̄
n) and ρ̃2 = m̄p̄ ×ρ2 × (1− s̄
m), respectively.
In the long term, a one-unit increase in the consumer base leads to 1
1−β̃1
additional con-
sumers via CC−1, and
γ̃2
1−β̃1







additional merchants via the MM−1 of
merchants. For each consumer and merchant, we use Vn and Vm, respectively, to denote the
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value they generate in one period. We use the discounted cash flow approach to compute
value perpetuity (Brealey et al., 2012). Thus, the consumer value is represented by the total
increased profits associated with a one-unit increase in the consumer base.3 Formally, the














Where Vn is equal to the profit generated by one consumer in each period, and Vm = γ̃1×Vn.














We can then evaluate the effectiveness of a user growth strategy by comparing the
CLV and the user acquisition cost. We denote the consumer acquisition cost and merchant
acquisition cost as ACn and ACm, respectively. A user growth strategy is effective only
when CLV 2n > ACn, and a merchant growth strategy is effective when CLV 2m > ACm.
1.3.3 Platform Heterogeneity in User Growth Strategy
An interesting question to consider is why the effectiveness of a user growth strategy varies
by platforms with strong CNEt . According to Equation 1.7 and 1.8, the CLV is jointly
determined by the strength of both SNEt−1 and CNEt . The existence of SNEt−1 makes the
influence of CNEt persist over time and thus amplifies the impact of CNEt on CLV . In the
extreme case when SNEt−1 is absent on a platform, CNEt only creates value in the current
period, resulting in a short-term boost in CLV . However, when the SNEt−1 positive and
3To simplify the calculation, we assume there is no discount of profits across periods.
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strong, any incremental shocks to the user base continue creating value in future periods,
leading to amplified CLV .
Table 1.2: How SNEt−1 Amplifies The Impact of CNEt on CLV .
ASn 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
β1 0 0.5 0.667 0.75 0.8 0.833 0.857 0.875 0.889 0.9
Figure 1.2: Cash Flow in Each Period When SNEt−1 Changes.
ASn = 1, β1 = 0 ASn = 2, β1 = 0.5
ASn = 4, β1 = 0.75 ASn = 8, β1 = 0.875
We use ASn and ASm to denote the amplification size of SNEt−1 of consumers and




.To illustrate the impact of SNEt−1 on AS, we vary the value of β1 and compute the
changes in ASn in Table 1.2. Not only does ASn increase with β1, but also the increase in
ASn accelerates when β1 becomes larger. The reason is that the increase in β1 increases
the consumer base and merchant base in all future periods brought by a one-unit increase
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in the current consumer base. Figure 1.2 depicts the users brought by SNEt−1 in future
periods when ASn equals 1,2,4,and 8, respectively. It is worth noting that the SNEt−1 of
consumers has a greater impact on CLV , while the SNEt−1 of merchants has a greater
impact on merchant lifetime value. For the CLV , the SNEt−1 of consumers amplifies the
value created on both sides, while the SNEt−1 of merchants only amplifies the value created
on the merchant side. For the merchant lifetime value, the SNEt−1 of merchants amplifies
the value created on both sides, while the SNEt−1 of consumers only amplifies the value
created on the consumer side.
The impact of SNEt−1 on CLV has important managerial implications. Platform man-
agers need to understand the level of SNEt−1 on their platforms, so that they can calculate
the user value and evaluate the ROI for their growth strategy. Recent research has shown
that the strength of SNEt−1 depends on the nature of products. Using learning models,
Hagiu & Wright (2020a); Wu et al. (2015) showed how the consumption from previous
users reveals information about product quality and thus reduces uncertainty when current
consumers make choices. The value of this learning effect depends on the level of product
uncertainty on the platforms: those with higher uncertainty would expect a higher SNEt−1
effect (Hagiu & Wright, 2020b). Not only would SNEt−1 vary by platform, but also it may
differ by product type, as long as the uncertainty level is different. Using Groupon data,
Li & Wu (2018) distinguish experience goods and search goods and show that the effect
of past sales is higher for experience goods than for search goods, because the former has
higher uncertainty than the latter. Therefore, we hypothesize that the SNEt−1 of experi-
enced goods is stronger than that of search goods, and that platforms providing different
products would exhibit heterogeneity in user stickiness. In the next section, we test this
hypothesis and discuss our identification strategies.
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1.4 DATA AND ESTIMATION
This section presents the empirical setting and our identification strategy.
1.4.1 Empirical Setting and Data
We estimate our model and discuss the CLV analysis using data from the daily deal mar-
ket. Daily deal platforms such as Groupon emerged around 2008 as two-sided markets
connecting merchants and consumers with discounted deals. Figure 1.3 shows the growth
of Groupon’s consumer base, profit, revenue, and market value over the past ten years.
Groupon experienced rapid convex growth in its first several years, before reaching 2013
revenues of $2.6 billion, but then it almost stopped growing. As a forecast of future growth,
its market value experienced a sharp decline in 2012. Analysts observed that the consumer
base and revenues had a highly correlated trend. For years, a central question for Groupon
senior management was: Should Groupon further promote the growth of its consumer base?
This question makes Groupon a valuable setting for our research.
The daily deal market is ideal to answer our research questions for several reasons.
The market was largely dominated by two leading platforms: Groupon and LivingSocial,
making it easier to control for the competition effects. Around our data collection pe-
riod, Groupon and LivingSocial made up roughly 59% and 17% of the total revenue in the
U.S. group buying discount market, respectively.4 In our estimation, we use Groupon as
the focal platform to estimate the parameters of interest and use LivingSocial to control
for competition. Perhaps more importantly, it is critical for us to examine how SNEt−1
and CNEt vary by product (especially between experience goods and search goods) after
the overall quality and brand name of the platform is controlled for. Comparing different
platforms would face tremendous identification challenges, because the nature of prod-
4Statistica 2013, http://www.statista.com/statistics/322293/groupon-market-share-us/.
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Figure 1.3: Groupon Growth from 2010-2019.
ucts offered by different platforms would be indistinguishable from the intrinsic quality
of the platforms. Fortunately, Groupon offers products from both experience and search
categories. By leveraging the panel data structure across categories and markets, we can
estimate the effects of users after eliminating the effects attributable to platform quality.
Our sample includes Groupon’s largest 108 markets from January 2012 to December
2012. Table 1.3 provides summary statistics by market and week. Note that the platform’s
consumer base is not directly observed in this study. In the estimation, it is represented
using the transaction volume. Using transaction volume has an advantage of capturing the
number of active users rather than dormant users who did not make a purchase. Com-
pared with the number of registered accounts, transaction volume is better aligned with
the decision-making process underlying Equations 1.2 and 1.5, because consumers and
merchants can observe the transaction volume but not the number of inactive consumers.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics by Market and Week
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Consumer base 5,707 4,685.12 6,085.98 4 111,820
Merchant base 5,707 22.4 17.19 1 130
Average deal price 5,707 78.06 53.94 11 770
Rival’s consumer base 5,707 2,828.47 8,935.2 0 425,030
Rival’s merchant base 5,707 10.9 9.16 0 57
Merchant’s experience 5,707 0.59 0.2 0 1
Deal duration 5,707 4.15 0.97 0 13.54
1.4.2 Estimation and Identification
In this section, we present the estimation and identification strategy for the effects of the
user base.
1.4.2.1 Identification for the Inter-temporal Effect
We begin by discussing the estimation for the inter-temporal effect of the user base. As
shown in Equations 1.2 and 1.5, the inter-temporal effect of the user base is captured by
the lag(s) of the consumer base and merchant base. As the dependent variable, i.e., the
logarithm of relative market share, is also a function of the user base, our specification
is a variant of the dynamic panel linear model. This specification has the advantage of
controlling for heterogeneity and allowing the distinction between the short-run and long-
run dynamics, but calls for special attention on estimation.
It is well known that the ordinary least square (OLS) estimator for the lagged user base
(i.e., β1 and β2) is biased in dynamic panel linear models. By construction, lnn j,t−1 in
Equation 1.2 and lnm j,t−1 in Equation 1.5 are correlated with the market fixed effects. To
eliminate the unobserved market effects, we apply the first-difference approach proposed
by Anderson & Hsiao (1981) and Arellano & Bond (1991). Take Equation 1.2 as an exam-
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ple. After the first-difference transformation, it becomes
∆ lnY nj,t = β1∆ lnn j,t−1 + γ1∆ lnm jt +ρ1∆ ln p jt +θ1∆ lnR jt +η1∆X jt +ϕ1∆Tt +∆ξ
n
jt ,








j,t − lnY nj,t−1, ∆ lnn j,t−1 = lnn j,t−1− lnn j,t−2 and so on.
The error terms are assumed to have zero serial correlations for the same cross-sectional
unit, i.e., E(ξnjtξ
n
jt ′) = 0 for all t ̸= t
′ 5.
Furthermore, the levels of the dependent variable lagged two periods or more are valid
instruments in the equation of first-differences (Arellano & Bond, 1991). The identification
restriction is specified as
E(lnn j,t−p∆ξnjt) = 0,where p ∈ {2,3, .., t −1}; t ∈ {3,4, ...,T}.
The instruments are used to form the objective function for the generalized method
of moments (GMM) (Hansen, 1982; Wooldridge, 2010), forming the Difference GMM
(DGMM) estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995).
1.4.2.2 Identification for the Within-period Network Effect
The identification challenge underlying the parameters for the classic network effect is that
the consumer base and merchant base are simultaneously determined in Equations 1.2 and
1.5, causing an endogeneity concern. We address this problem by providing instrumental
variables for lnn jt and lnm jt , respectively.
We first present the instrumental variables for the merchant base lnm jt in Equation 1.2.
A valid instrument should be correlated with the number of merchants but orthogonal to
the demand shock ξnjt . We used two sets of instruments here. First, following the pre-
5The test results for the auto-correlation assumption is presented in the results section.
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determined variable in Arellano & Bond (1991), we use the lag of merchant size (after
logarithm transformation) as the instrument. The argument is that the demand shock to
consumer base in period t should not be correlated with the merchant size in period t −2,
after controlling for all the other variables in the model. Second, we also leverage political
advertising as an exogenous variation for identification. During an election year, political
candidates and interest groups (including party committees and outside political action
groups known as PACs and superPACs) invest heavily in television advertising, leading to
an increase in ad prices (Moshary et al., 2021). The increased cost of advertising leads
merchants to look for alternative marketing avenues such as participating in daily deals
(Dholakia, 2011; Edelman et al., 2016). Thus, the number of merchants on deal platforms
should be correlated with the amount of political election advertising in the market.6 In this
empirical setting, it often takes some time for the merchants to negotiate with the platform
to determine the terms Li et al. (2017b). Thus, we use the political advertising in period
t−1 as the instrument because such a specification captures the time lag associated with the
merchant base in t. The lagged advertising variable also helps the exogenous assumption
in that past political advertising should not directly affect the current deal demand ξnjt .
Our data collection year, 2012, happened to be a presidential election year in the U.S..
We collect data on political advertisements across four types of elections that year (presi-
dential, gubernatorial, House, and Senate elections) (Fowler & Ridout, 2015), and compute
the total amount of air time and ad spending across all candidates and parties in each market
j during week t.7
6In our data, we find positive correlations between merchant size and political advertising (the Pearson
correlation coefficient was 0.19 (p<0.001) with ad spending and 0.05 (p<0.001) with air time, indicating that
there was a positive association between the number of merchants on Groupon and the amount of TV election
ads in the market. We provide the detailed first-stage analysis in the results section.
7The data on political advertising are at the designated market area (DMA) level. We map the advertising
data onto the Groupon divisions (i.e., markets). The markets that fall into the same DAM have the same
value for the advertising variables. Including ads from gubernatorial, House, and Senate elections helped
address the unequal allocation of campaign resources between battleground and non-battleground states for
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We follow a similar identification strategy for the consumer base lnn jt in Equation 1.5.
We use two sets of instruments: (1) the lag of consumer base with a degree of 2, and (2)
the precipitation and temperature in each market. The identification argument for precip-
itation and temperature is based on the finding that consumers online shopping behaviors
are shown to be influenced by weather conditions. Using data from large-scale field experi-
ments, Li et al. (2017a) provided robust evidence that consumer online shopping behaviors
deviate significantly on rainy days from sunny days, because of the impacts of weather on
the mood and psychological states of consumers. Based on these, we argue that the local
weekly temperature and precipitation should correlate with consumers intention to shop
Groupon deals, providing the first-stage variation for identification. However, precipitation
and temperature at time t should not be correlated with the supply-side error ξmj,t , because
the merchant base has been determined prior to t due to the processing and negotiation time
gap required for merchants to show up on the platform. Thus, the exogenous requirement
for using precipitation and temperature as the instrumental variable is met.
1.4.2.3 Other Variables
Market size Our specification requires the "size" for each market. On the consumer side,
the market size is defined as the total number of users who could participate in the daily
deal market. Because anyone with Internet access could use a deal site, we use the number
of Internet users as the measure of market size. The data are retrieved from the October
2012 School Enrollment and Internet Use Survey, a supplement to the Current Population
Survey (CPS) by the U.S. Census Bureau.
On the merchant size, we measure the market size using the number of businesses in
each local market in 2012, which is extracted from the County Business Patterns (CBP)
presidential elections. In our data, only 5 (4.7%) DMAs received zero political advertising in 2012 and the
remaining 95.3% all had some levels of election advertising on TV.
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database from the the U.S. Census Bureau. 8 This data source tracks the number of busi-
nesses in each market along with the NAICS industry code and a short description. We
matched the NAICS with the merchant types in Groupon and LivingSocial and selected the
business categories that have participated in the daily deal industry.
Experience versus Search Goods We code product categories on Groupon into experi-
ence goods and search goods based on the nature of the product and services. Following
Li & Wu (2018), we administered an online survey to classify whether a good or service
possesses more experience attributes or search attributes. A total of 818 respondents were
asked to imagine that user reviews are not available on a platform and then asked to assess
for each category, to what extent it is easy(hard) to evaluate the quality without seeing or
trying it.9 The score closer to easy (coded as 1) corresponds to more of a search good, and
vice versa for experience goods if the score is closer to "hard" (coded as 7) (Nelson, 1974).
To ensure that respondents can finish the survey within 5 minutes, each respondent an-
swered a random selection of 15 categories (on average, each category was rated by 136.3
respondents).
Table x presents the summary statistics from the survey. Across the total of 78 cate-
gories, the mean score is 4.72 (Standard Deviation = 1.02) and the median is 4.97. We used
the median split and code each category into two groups: experience goods if the average
score of that category is greater than the median and vice versa for search goods. Among
our categories, the ones with the highest scores (i.e., experience goods) were "hair salons",
facials", and "makeup services," and those with the lowest scores (i.e., search goods) were
"holiday decor," "gifts: candles, phone cases, stationary," and "office supplies." Note that
8https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cbp/data/datasets.html. Accessed Feb 2021.
9A total of 1,112 respondents were recruited on Amazon MTurk to participate the survey. 294 (26%)
respondents failed the attention filler questions and hence were removed from the analysis. The detailed
survey design and summary statistics are included in the Appendix.
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mean split yielded very similar results since only two categories in the middle would switch
groups. In subsequent analysis, we used the MTurk responses to classify the categories.
Table 1.4: Summary Description of Amazon MTurk Online Survey
N Mean SD Median Min Max
All category 78 4.72 1.02 4.97 1.98 6.39
Experience Goods 39 5.59 0.36 5.51 5.01 6.39
Search Goods 39 3.85 0.65 3.97 1.98 4.94
To cross-check our experience-versus-search goods classification, we conducted an of-
fline survey using a different design. Twenty-eight business-school graduate students at a
major U.S. university participated in the survey. Each student was asked to code the pro-
duct/service categories on Groupon using a binary response: the "search" type (denoted as
Ei = 0) or the "experience" type (denoted as Ei = 1). Across all respondents, the Fleiss’
Kappa is 0.603, indicating a moderate level of average inter-coder reliability (Fleiss, 1971).
For each category, we used the majority voting: a category was classified as the experience
type if more than half of the respondents coded Ei = 1. Out of the categories, 8 (10.3%)
were coded as search goods by MTurk respondents but switched to experience type in
the validation survey; 5 (6.4%) switched from experience to search type; and the rest 65
(83.3%) were consistent between the two surveys. We estimated the main models based
on the validation survey and obtained qualitatively similar results. The detailed model
estimates are found in the appendix.
Price Lastly, deal price in Equations 1.2 and 1.5 could also be endogenous. A rational
platform would strategically adjust the deal price in response to an expected shock in de-
mand and supply. For example, if the demand is expected to be low, a platform would be
incentivized to reduce the price. In the same vein, if the supply is expected to be strong,
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the platform would also be incentivized to adjust prices to increase profits. To address this
issue, we use the lagged deal prices as the instrument for p jt . The identification assump-
tion is that, after controlling for the market fixed effects and other variables, the prices from




In this section, we present the parameter estimates. As aforementioned, we leverage the
fact that Groupon offers products and services of different categories in different markets,
which allows us to estimate different aspects of network effects in a quasi multi-platform
context. We estimate the consumer-side model (Equation 1.2) for search and experience
goods, respectively, and present the results in Table 1.5. Similarly, the estimates for the
merchant-side model (Equation 1.5) for search and experience goods are presented in Table
1.6. For each table, we present the fixed effect estimator and the results based on the
DGMM estimator after applying first-differencing and the instruments. In the subsequent
section, we interpret the coefficients based on the DGMM results.
On the consumer side, the SNEt−1 is estimated to heterogeneous between experience
and search goods. While the SNEt−1 is positive and significant for experience goods (0.096,
p < 0.05), it is insignificant for search goods (-0.034, p>0.10). As hypothesized, because
of the higher uncertainty prior to consumption, more existing consumers can shed light
on the quality of goods on the platform and attract more future consumers, yielding a
positive SNEt−1. However, the quality uncertainty for search goods can be reduced through
information search (for example, doing online searches or reading consumer reports), the
size of existing consumer base is no longer found important for attracting future consumers.
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Table 1.5: Parameter Estimates for Consumer-Side Model
Experience Goods FE DGMM
Est (SE) Est (SE)
Lagged consumer base (β1) 0.030** (0.013) 0.096** (0.039)
Merchant base (γ1) 1.297*** (0.029) 1.439*** (0.072)
Deal price (ρ1) -0.286*** (0.016) -0.656*** (0.098)
Rival consumer base (θ1n) 0.073*** (0.012) 0.075** (0.019)
Rival merchant base (θ1m) -0.013 (0.035) -0.057 (0.050)
Returning merchants -0.418*** (0.074) -0.278** (0.114)
Deal duration 0.102*** (0.010) 0.142*** (0.028)
Week -0.007*** (0.001) -0.008*** (0.001)
Week-square 2.9E-6 (4.4E-5) 2.6E-5 (5.0E-5)
Sample size 5,324 5,212
R-square 0.723
Number of instruments 110
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(101) = 101.88, p = 0.457
Difference-in-Hansen test for consumer base χ2(50) = 19.81, p = 1.000
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(9) = 2.89, p = 0.968
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 14.58, p = 1.000
Search Goods FE DGMM
Est (SE) Est (SE)
Lagged consumer base (β1) -0.018 (0.012) -0.034 (0.036)
Merchant base (γ1) 2.012*** (0.040) 1.970*** (0.128)
Deal price (ρ1) -0.383*** (0.019) -0.448*** (0.100)
Rival consumer base (θ1n) -0.005 (0.023) -0.032 (0.047)
Rival merchant base (θ1m) -0.118* (0.067) -0.180 (0.137)
Returning merchants -0.533*** (0.074) -0.325*** (0.113)
Duration -0.036*** (0.013) 0.043 (0.029)
Week -0.013*** (0.001) -0.014** (0.005)
Week-square -6.6E-5 (8.3E-5) -1.8E-5 (2.1E-4)
Sample size 4175 3,801
R-square 0.554
Number of instruments 110
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(101) = 94.20, p = 0.671
Difference-in-Hansen test for consumer base χ2(50) = 27.66, p = 0.996
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(9) = 5.50, p = 0.789
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 28.51, p = 0.995
FE is the fixed-effect estimator and DGMM is the first-difference GMM estimator.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table 1.6: Parameter Estimates for Merchant-Side Model
Experience Goods FE DGMM
Est SE Est SE
Lagged merchant base (β2) 0.190*** (0.016) 0.417*** (0.053)
Consumer base (γ2) 0.276*** (0.005) 0.423*** (0.018)
Deal price (ρ2) 0.107*** (0.008) 0.411*** (0.050)
Rival consumer base (θ2n) 0.013** (0.006) -0.023** (0.011)
Rival merchant base (θ2m) 0.151*** (0.017) 0.131*** (0.028)
Returning merchants 0.155** (0.035) 0.173** (0.067)
Week 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002** (0.001)
Week-square -6.0E-5*** (2.1E-5) 6.6E-5** (2.7E-5)
Sample size 5,324 5,242
R-square 0.8773
Number of instruments 111
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(103) = 106.05, p = 0.399
Difference-in-Hansen test for consumer base χ2(10) = 5.64, p = 0.844
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(50) = 17.32, p = 1.000
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 12.35, p = 1.000
Search Goods FE DGMM
Est SE Est SE
Lagged merchant base (β2) 0.024 (0.017) 0.242*** (0.057)
Consumer base (γ2) 0.276*** (0.005) 0.380*** (0.023)
Deal price (ρ2) 0.153*** (0.008) 0.196*** (0.052)
Rival consumer base (θ2n) 0.024** (0.010) -0.002 (0.018)
Rival merchant base (θ2m) 0.103*** (0.028) 0.117** (0.050)
Returning merchants 0.194** (0.031) 0.170*** (0.051)
Week 0.012*** (0.001) 0.009*** (0.002)
Week-square 1.9E-4*** (348E-5) -5.1E-5 (8.7E-5)
Sample size 4,175 3,801
R-square 0.834
Number of instruments 111
Hansen test χ2(103) = 97.56, p = 0.633
Difference-in-Hansen test for consumer base χ2(10) = 0.31, p = 1.000
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(50) = 31.75, p = 0.979
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 25.00, p = 0.999
FE is the fixed-effect estimator and DGMM is the first-difference GMM estimator.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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The pattern is different for the CNEt . The effect of merchants on consumers is found to
be positive and significant for both categories. The CNEt for experience goods is estimated
to be 1.439 (p<0.01), and the CNEt for search goods is estimated to be even 37% higher
than the former (1.970, p<0.01).
On the merchant side, the SNEt−1 is estimated to be positive and significant for expe-
rience goods (0.417, p<0.01) and search goods (0.242, p<0.01). The CNEt of consumers
on merchants is also estimated to exist for both product markets. The CNEt for experience
goods is estimated to be 0.423 (p<0.01), and the CNEt for search goods is estimated to be
0.380 (p<0.01).
In sum, on the merchant side, the SNEt−1 for experience goods is found to be ap-
proximately 1.7 as large as that for search goods, while the CNEt is qualitatively similar
between these two categories. This is again consistent with our hypothesized effects. In the
experience-goods category, merchants benefit from the user-generated content that exist-
ing consumers have contributed, because it can help reduce quality uncertainty and create
demand. Thus, the SNEt−1 of the merchants is found to be larger for merchants of expe-
rience goods. In contrast, merchants offering search goods do not benefit as much from
existing user-generated content, and the SNEt−1 in the search-goods category is significant
but weaker.
Note that the above results applies to the market level. More merchants offering ex-
perience goods in a market can help reduce the quality uncertainty for the overall market,
attracting more future merchants of experience goods. But this effect does not speak to
whether the future merchants are returning merchants or new merchants. To address this
issue, we control for the number of returning merchants. We find that returning merchants
are positively related with merchant base for both experience goods (0.173, p<0.05) and
search goods (0.170, p<0.01),
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suggesting that returning merchants account for a larger proportion of the merchant
base for the former than the latter. This is consistent with our conjecture that UGC (such
as consumer reviews) contributes to merchants’ switching cost on platforms, more so for
experience goods than for search goods. Nerveless, for both categories, the SNEt−1 of
merchants is positive and significant after taking returning merchants into account.
Next, we present the results for control variables. Not surprisingly, price is estimated
to have a negative effect on consumer base and a positive effect on the merchant base. For
experience goods, the consumer price elasticity is estimated to be -0.656 (p<0.01), and the
merchant price elasticity is estimated to be 0.411 (p<0.01). For search goods, the consumer
price elasticity is estimated to be -0.448 (p<0.01), the merchant price elasticity is estimated
to be 0.196 (p<0.01).
Furthermore, after controlling for SNEt−1 and CNEt , the number of returning mer-
chant is found to be negatively related with consumer base for experience goods (-0.278,
p < 0.05) and search goods (-0.325, p < 0.01), indicating that consumers overall respond
more positively to new merchants. This finding is consistent with the "switching risk reduc-
tion" hypothesis in (Li et al., 2011): because user reviews are more helpful for informing
consumers for experience goods, consumers find it less risky to try new products rather
than sticking with known products, resulting in a negative association between returning
merchants and the consumer base. In other words, consumers respond more positively to
new merchants than to existing merchants.
To verify the validity of our results, it is critical to assess the extent to which the as-
sumptions are met for the DGMM estimator. The first important assumption is that the in-
strumental variables used for identification should be exogenous to the errors. We present
the results from the Hansen test of overidentification restrictions. On the consumer side, the
Hansen test statistics are χ2(101) = 101.88 (p = 0.457) and χ2(101) = 94.20 (p = 0.671)
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for experience and search goods, respectively. On the merchant side, the test statistics are
χ2(103) = 106.05 (p = 0.399) for experience goods and χ2(103) = 97.56 (p = 0.633) for
search goods. These results indicate that the null hypothesis of that all IVs are exogenous
should not be rejected at 0.05 level. Furthermore, Tables 1.5 and 1.6 include the Difference-
in-Hansen test for each endogenous variable in our models. The results indicate that the
exogenous IV assumption is not rejected for all endogenous variables.
Table 1.7: Results of First-stage Regression
Consumer Side R2 Partial R2 F Statistic p
Experience Goods Endogeneous consumer base 0.808 0.016 4.723 p<0.001
Endogeneous merchant base 0.889 0.012 24.801 p<0.001
Search Goods Endogeneous consumer base 0.413 0.026 6.074 p<0.001
Endogeneous merchant base 0.539 0.010 15.189 p<0.001
Merchant Side R2 Partial R2 F Statistic p
Experience Goods Endogeneous consumer base 0.810 0.014 17.277 p<0.001
Endogeneous merchant base 0.456 0.002 2.190 p<0.001
Search Goods Endogeneous consumer base 0.911 0.013 3.983 p=0.053
Endogeneous merchant base 0.527 0.026 6.590 p<0.001
Next, we present the first-stage diagnostic statistics for the instrumental variables (see
Table 1.7). To examine the strength of the instruments, the first-stage model was fit re-
gressing the endogenous consumer base and merchant base on its respective instruments,
controlling for all the exogenous variables including the market fixed effects. We begin
by the consumer side model. For experience goods, the first-stage R-square was higher
than 0.80 for both endogenous variables, which was perhaps due to the market fixed ef-
fects and week effect. After removing the effect due to the exogenous variables, market
and time effects, the first-stage F statistic was 4.723, p < 0.001 for the consumer base and
the F statistic was 24.801 (p < 0.001) for the merchant base. For search goods, the over-
all R-square was lower, but the first-stage test statistics were still significant (F = 6.074,
p < 0.001 for consumer base and F = 15.189, p < 0.001 for merchant base). Although the
34
first-stage F statistics were modest for the endogenous consumer base, we would like to
emphasize that the IV estimates were substantially different across the two types of prod-
ucts: the SNEt−1 was positive and significant (0.096, p < 0.05) for the experience goods
and insignificant for search goods (-0.034, p > 0.010). Thus, the heterogeneous SNEt−1
between experience and search products is not driven by the difference in the explanatory
power of the IVs. The first-stage statistics are qualitatively similar for the merchant size
model. The F statistics are modest for both endogenous variables but the p-values were all
smaller than 0.1, even after controlling for all the exogenous variables, the time effect, and
the extensive set of market fixed effects.
1.5.2 The Analysis of A User Growth Strategy
In this section, we calculate CLV based on the parameter estimates from the foregoing
models and examine the effectiveness of a user growth strategy by comparing its CLV and
user acquisition cost.
1.5.2.1 The Customer Lifetime Value in Two-sided Markets
To compute the CLV , we first transform the unit free elasticity coefficients from Table 1.5
and 1.6 to the unit denominated marginal coefficients needed for marginal analysis in Table
1.8.
Table 1.8: Marginal Effects Of Independent Variables
Marginal Effects β̃1 β̃2 γ̃1 γ̃2 ρ̃1 ρ̃2
Experience Goods 0.096 0.416 320.7 0.002 -32.7 0.092
Search Goods 0 0.242 365.4 0.002 -3.455 0.008
We then use the CLV of consumers as an example for demonstration. Since the marginal
cost of serving an additional consumer is almost zero for digital platforms, Vn of Groupon
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represents its gross profit generated by a consumer in each period. Note that Groupon’s
gross profit is not directly observed in the data. Thus, we use its revenue multiplied by
the gross margin to approximate it. First, we use half of the gross billing as a proxy for
revenue according to Dholakia (2011) 10. Gross billing is the total sales on Groupon,
which is calculated from the transaction volume and deal price. Note that the transaction
volume is used as a proxy for the consumer base. Thus, we use the increased consumer
base multiplied by the deal price to calculate the gross billing. Second, in Groupon’s 2012
annual report, the gross profit accounted for less than 70% of Groupon’s revenue. In later
years, this percentage decreased to around 50%. We use 70% of Groupon’s revenue to
represent the gross profit, which sets an upper bound of the CLV .
According to Equation 1.7, we calculate the CLV in experience-goods and search-goods
markets, respectively. The same logic applies to the merchant lifetime value. Table 1.9
reports the CLV . According to our calculation, a consumer is worth $67 and a merchant is
worth $33,314 in the experience-goods market. In the search-goods market, a consumer is
worth $42 and a merchant is worth $20,877. Although the CNEt of experience goods and
search goods are all positive and significant, the CLV of experience goods is larger than that
of search goods, as a result of the differences in SNEt−1. In the experience-goods market,
the SNEt−1 of consumers amplifies the CLV by 1.15 times, and the SNEt−1 of merchants
amplifies the merchant lifetime value by 1.66 times. In the search-goods market, due to
the absence of the significant SNEt−1 of consumers and the relative weaker SNEt−1 of
merchants, the user value created on both sides of the market has less opportunity to be
amplified over time. The positive shocks that a market may receive in one period quickly
dissipate and do not result in persistent user value creation.
10It is also consistent with the ratio of revenue to gross billing in Groupon’s 2012 annual report. Groupon’s
gross billings and revenue in North America in 2012 is $2,373.153 million and $1,165.7 million, respectively,
yielding a ratio of gross billing to revenue of 49.12%.
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Table 1.9: Estimated Customer Lifetime Value
Customer Lifetime Value Consumer Vn Merchant Vm
Experience Goods($) 62 31,654
Search Goods ($) 54 26,338
1.5.2.2 The User Acquisition Cost
To boost growth, platforms can consider marketing to increase their consumer base, hoping
that the incremental consumer base could lead to future increases in the consumer base and
merchant base. In this section, we consider two commonly used marketing strategies: (1)
advertising to buy users, and (2) implementing price discounts. We then compare the CLV
computed in the previous section to the consumer acquisition cost. Note that this analysis
can be applied to both consumer side and merchant side. However, platforms’ cost to
acquire merchants is typically unavailable to researchers, which is the case for Groupon.
In its annual report, Groupon reported neither the expense of acquiring merchants nor the
growth of its merchant base. As a result, our cost-and-benefit analysis focuses on the
consumer side.
Intervention – Acquisition Through Marketing. We first look at the scenario when the
platform uses advertising marketing as the user-growth strategy. The consumer acquisi-
tion cost (CAC) in this case is calculated as the total marketing expense divided by the
total number of acquired consumers (Gupta et al., 2004; McCarthy & Fader, 2018). In its
2012 annual report, Groupon reported a total marketing expense of $336.85 million with
7.3 million consumers acquired worldwide, yielding an acquisition cost of $46 per new
consumer globally. In North America, the marketing expense was $105.9 million, but the
report did not include the total number of consumers acquired in North America. Based on
the proportion of gross billing in North America ($2.37 billion) relative to worldwide sales
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($5.38 billion), we estimated the number of new consumers in North America as 3.22 mil-
lion, which yields an estimated cost of $33 to acquire a new consumer. Table 1.10 reports
Groupon’s consumer acquisition costs in North America and worldwide. It represents a
net CLV of $29 for experience goods but a negative CLV of $21 for search goods in North
American. Note that fixed costs and operating costs associated with serving consumers are
not included in this calculation. If we amortize these costs to each consumer, the net CLV
will decrease further.
Table 1.10: Cost-and-Benefit Analysis of Marketing Acquisition
North America Worldwide
Consumer acquisition cost ($) 33 46
Net CLV (experience goods) ($) 29 16
Net CLV (search goods) ($) 21 8
Intervention – Price Cut. In a two-sided market, a price cut can stimulate greater partic-
ipation on the discounted side, as well as the cross side of the market through within-period
network effects. We analyze the cost and benefit of a price cut on each side of the market.
We use the formula of the marginal effect of the deal price in Section 5.2.1 to calculate the
increase in the consumer base and merchant base for the promotion on each side, which is
then multiplied by the CLV and merchant lifetime value to obtain the total increased value.
Table 1.11 illustrates these results. For experience goods, a $1 cut in the deal price
brings 33.2 additional consumers and 0.063 additional merchants, yielding a total increased
value of $4,035. Based on the average transaction volume of each market, the promotion
cost is calculated to be $3,959. Thus, the net gain from deal promotion is $ 76. For search
goods, a $1 cut in the deal price brings 4.03 additional consumers and 0.008 additional
merchants, yielding a total increased value of $435. Based on the average transaction
volume of each market, the promotion cost is calculated to be $704. Thus, the net gain
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from deal promotion is $ -269. Due to the difference between the CLV of experience goods
and search goods, the deal promotion for experience goods is cost-effective but the deal
promotion for search goods is not cost-effective.
Table 1.11: Cost-and-Benefit Analysis of Price Promotion
$1 price cut Experience Goods Search Goods
Increase in consumer base 33.2 4.03
Increase in merchant base 0.063 0.008
Total increase in value ($) 4,035 435
Promotion cost ($) 3,959 704
Net gain ($) 76 -269
1.6 PLATFORM DESIGNS TO ENHANCE USER STICKINESS
For platforms with a strong CNEt but a weak SNEt−1, platform design choices that enhance
user stickiness may offer greater leverage than common marketing strategies that bring
users to a platform. In this research, we define user stickiness as the ability of the platform
to continually attract users in each period. We first calculate the CLV in simulations when
the user stickiness is enhanced, and then discuss two methods of enhancing user stickiness.
One method considers platform design choices that enhance the SNEt−1 of users through
improved reputation systems. The second method considers the design choices that are
not derived from user network effects but from the improved platform attractiveness. For
example, the development of a merchant information management system reduces the risk
of disintermediation and reroutes transactions through the platform rather than conducting
them off-platform. The direct implications of this design intervention is that users users
become stickier on the platform, leading to an increase in CLV . Lastly, we discuss the
feasibility of these platform design choices as compared to a similar firm.
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1.6.1 Simulation of Enhancing User Stickiness
We use the CLV in the experience-goods market as an example to simulate the impact of
changing the strength of SNEt−1 of consumers (i.e., modifying β1). We simulate three
scenarios of β1: 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, and compute the corresponding updated CLV . Similarly,
we simulate the impact of changing the strength of SNEt−1 of merchants by modifying β2.
Table 1.12 presents the results.
Table 1.12: Customer Lifetime Value in Response to Changing the Strength
of SNEt−1
SNEt−1 of Consumers (β1) 0.1 0.096(observed) 0.5 0.9
Consumer value ($) 62 62 111 557
Merchant value ($) 31,728 31,654 45,086 165,317
SNEt−1 of Merchants (β2) 0.1 0.417(observed) 0.5 0.9
Consumer value ($) 51 62 67 211
Merchant value ($) 20,505 31,654 36,908 184,541
When the SNEt−1 of users changes, it has a substantial impact on CLV s. Boosting β1
from 0.096 to 0.5 would improve the CLV by 1.8 times and the merchant lifetime value by
1.4 times. Boosting β1 from 0.096 to 0.9 would improve the CLV by 9 times and the mer-
chant lifetime value by 5.2 times. Boosting β2 from 0.417 to 0.5 would improve the CLV
by 1.1 times and the merchant lifetime value by 1.2 times. Boosting β1 from 0.417 to 0.9
would improve the CLV by 3.4 times and the merchant lifetime value by 5.8 times. Note
that changing the SNEt−1 of consumers has a larger impact on CLV than merchant lifetime
value. Similarly, changing the SNEt−1 of merchants has a larger impact on merchant life-
time value than CLV . It is worth noting that consumer acquisition marketing becomes more
cost-effective as the SNEt−1 of users increases.
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Figure 1.4: Average Units per Consumer: Groupon vs Meituan
1.6.2 Discussion of Platform Design Choices
The scale of these effects raises the question of whether enhancing user stickiness is fea-
sible. Could managerial decisions concerning platform design have large strategic growth
implications? Evidence from another daily deal platform suggests that these outcomes are
indeed possible. Meituan launched in 2010, two years after Groupon, as a daily deal plat-
form that used an identical business model. Both platforms leveraged group buying power
to offer coupons and volume discounts to price-sensitive consumers. Both ran a decade of
losses in an effort to grow their markets and market shares. Interestingly, Meituan adopted
strategies that focused on boosting user participation and other platform designs that in-
crease platform attractiveness. These strategies enhanced user stickiness and sustained
strong network effects.
Enhancing User Stickiness Through Network Effects. First, Meituan merged with Di-
anping (a Chinese Yelp) to offer more UGC on the platform. As new transactions generated
more user-review data, UGC improved recommendations, created positive feedback, and
increased user stickiness. Second, Meituan rewarded consumers for generating ideas and
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Figure 1.5: Customer Lifetime Value: Groupon vs Meituan ($)
for repeat purchases. It then used this data to help merchants identify new products and
situate new stores, which, again, increased their dependence on Meituan. By design, it
helped each side create more value for the other.
Enhancing User Stickiness Through Factors Other Than Network Effects. Third,
Meituan invested heavily in delivery and reservation systems. It expanded its services to
handle logistics and deliver not only food to consumers but also supplies to restaurants. Us-
ing technology to reduce friction encouraged restaurants and consumers to rely on Meituan,
effectively limiting disintermediation.
Figure 1.4 shows the average units per consumer 11 of Groupon and Meituan. We con-
sider the average units per consumer as a direct indicator of user stickiness. Groupon’s
average units per consumer gradually decreases while Meituan’s average units per con-
sumer continues to increase. A number of factors may have contributed to the divergent
CLV of Meituan and Groupon yet it is worth noting that the average units per consumer of
Meituan is 8.3 times that of Groupon in 2020, and the CLV of Meituan is 12 times that of
11In Groupon and Meituan’s financial report, the average units per consumer are the number of purchases




We study how users drive value in two-sided markets. Introducing the time dimension,
we develop a model of inter-temporal effects and within-period effects of users. Based
on the different types of network effects, we propose a framework to calculate the CLV
in a two-sided market. We then estimate the network effects and calculate the user value
using data from Groupon. Our analysis demonstrates why strong CNEt alone is insuffi-
cient for creating long-term value. For certain platforms, users do not keep each other on
the platform across periods; the weak inter-temporal attraction yields poor user stickiness.
Platforms lacking such user stickiness are unlikely to produce “winner-take-all” markets.
When this happens, neither buying users nor providing monetary subsidy to existing con-
sumers becomes a viable strategy. Under these circumstances, more effective strategies
should explore platform design that enhances user stickiness.
This research makes three contributions. First, our model separates the inter-temporal
effect from the within-period effect of users. This framework allows us to examine how
users drive value across time. When attrition dominates attraction, strong within-period ef-
fects are unsustainable in the long term. Based on different aspects of network effects, we
propose a method to estimate the CLV in two-sided markets. To the best of our knowledge,
our user-value model is the first that explicitly distinguishes the value increase cross-time
and cross-side. Thus, our approach can help platforms examine the effectiveness of dif-
ferent user growth strategies that may focus differently on user stickiness or cross-side
attraction. We would also like to highlight that our calculation only needs the estimates
from aggregated market-level data, which is widely available for any platforms. Thus, we
believe our proposed user-value framework can be easily implemented in practice.
43
Second, using Groupon data, this paper is the first to empirically estimate how different
aspects of network effects affect user participation over time, as well as how the inter-
temporal effects vary by product characteristics. We distinguish experience goods and
search goods on Groupon, and show that the SNEt−1 of consumers and merchants present
heterogeneity in these two markets, while the CNEt of consumers on merchants and the
CNEt of merchants on consumers are qualitatively similar.
Third, we discuss platform strategic response when it has a strong CNEt but a weak
SNEt−1. Our simulations show that platform design that enhances user stickiness can in-
crease CLV . After users become stickier, user acquisition marketing becomes more cost-
effective. As the examples of Meituan, Amazon, SAP, and other platforms demonstrate,
enhancing user stickiness is feasible and can be designed. Overall, our findings remind
managers not to overemphasize user growth when the user stickiness is poor and instead
focus on platform design that increases user stickiness.
There are several directions for future research. First, platforms have multiple ways
to improve their long-term value. Should a platform invest in user growth, the design of
network effects, key assets, brand, or other factors? It is worth gathering real data on the
comparative costs and benefits of these strategies before the platform makes investment
decisions. Second, in our empirical setting, we include the competition effect from the
primary competing platform. Although this should capture the competition in many mar-
kets, we acknowledge that, in some markets, there could be other major platforms as a
key player. Future analysis can improve the competition analysis. Lastly, the strengths
of the inter-temporal effects and within-period effects can differ strongly across different
industries. We have shown that they vary by product categories on one platform, and in




Platform Ecosystems, FinTech, and Big Data
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Technology changes the way information is collected, processed, and transmitted. It re-
duces the cost of financial services, thereby promoting financial inclusion. For example,
credit scoring lowers the information cost of loans by replacing costly local information
and the reduced information cost increases lending to small firms (Einav et al., 2013; Frame
et al., 2001). The recent digitization of data has generated new massive big data, and has led
to rapidly developing technology that can efficiently collect and process big data automat-
ically. FinTech lenders that can now process loan applications online based on technology
and big data have become an increasingly important source of loans, especially for low-
credit borrowers. Berg et al. (2020) show that a digital footprint (i.e., information that
users leave online) complements for credit bureau information, and affects access to credit
and reduces loan default rates. Berg et al. (2020); Hau et al. (2019) show that FinTech
improves loan screening and expands the credit given to borrowers with low credit scores.
Platforms are critical players in FinTech because their ecosystems generate massive
big data. On the one hand, such big data gives platforms an advantage in developing Fin-
Tech. Since numerous third-party complementors in the platform ecosystem are small
firms or have grown from small firms, FinTech that solves financial constraints of small
firms can stimulate entrepreneurship in the platform ecosystem (Evans & Jovanovic, 1989;
Holtz-Eakin et al., Summer 1994), thereby promoting the success of a platform’s ecosys-
tem (Panico & Cennamo, 2020). On the other hand, big data could be an important source
of the digital platforms’ market power. It makes the regulators worry about the big data
monopoly of giant platforms. Data are nonrival and private use of data leads to social inef-
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ficiency, while broad use of data across firms may generate significant social gains (Jones
& Tonetti, 2020). Furthermore, private use of data contributes to the market dominance of
platforms, and if platforms were required to open their data to other companies, it would
promote competition (Argenton & Prüfer, 2012; Krämer & Wohlfarth, 2018). Recently,
E.U. regulators discussed a policy proposal requiring platforms to open their data to other
companies, including banks, and FinTech companies 1. Interestingly, the U.S. and the E.U.
regulators have drastically different opinions on big data openness. Whereas big data ac-
cess requests are strongly supported in the E.U. they are not in the U.S. (Graef et al., 2015;
Krämer & Wohlfarth, 2018). According to Romer (1990), nonrivalry relates to the produc-
tion possibilities, while excludability depends on the legal system. Thus, the policy choices
of data openness affect the outcome of FinTech lending in the platform ecosystem includ-
ing financial inclusion and loan prices. The questions are: What is the optimal data open
policy? Can the market solve the problem better than a policy? These questions motivate
our research.
To answer these questions, we develop a theoretical model to study FinTech lending
in a platform ecosystem. Following Milone (2019), we model FinTech as a data-based
screening technology that can automatically screen firms based on information when issu-
ing loans. The information cost is a fundamental component of the lending cost, which
measures the expense of screening firms and can be considered as a fixed lending cost.
The banks use both hard information and soft information to screen firms. Hard informa-
tion is recorded as numbers and can be transmitted, while soft information is recorded as
text and is difficult to communicate (Liberti & Petersen, 2019). Soft information is costly
because it is collected by lenders over time through relationships with firms (Petersen &
Rajan, 1995). The business model of FinTech is to substitute hard information for soft
1https://www.ft.com/content/a5c7b640-526c-11ea-8841-482eed0038b1
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information and automate the screening of firms (Liberti & Petersen, 2019; Milone, 2019).
Thus, FinTech reduces the information cost. Since the information production presents
economies of scale (Petersen & Rajan, 1994), FinTech can be particularly important for
small firm lending (Karlan et al., 2016; Liberti & Petersen, 2019). We assume the platform
has an advantage in information cost because of FinTech, while banks have an advantage
in unit funding cost. We then study the FinTech lending in a platform ecosystem in the
following three cases.
For the first case, we assume that big data is a complete byproduct of the firms’ activ-
ities in the platform ecosystem, and the platform monopolizes big data. We show that in
developed countries with efficient banking systems, although the platform has an advan-
tage in big data, it still may not be able to compete with banks. In contrast, in developing
countries with inefficient banking systems, a platform equipped with big data is more likely
to be able to compete with banks. Thus, platforms in these countries have more room to
use FinTech to solve financial constraints of small firms. This difference explains an inter-
esting observation: the FinTech development of platforms presents great heterogeneity in
countries with strong platform ecosystems. For example, despite the leading position of the
U.S. platform economy, platforms have not developed a leading position in FinTech lend-
ing. In contrast, developing countries such as China have been at the forefront of FinTech
lending.
Furthermore, we discuss a special case in which small firms can obtain loans from the
platform through a long-term relationship: the platform subsidizes firms when they are
small and extracts rent when they grow larger. We show that FinTech further promotes
financial inclusion in this case. This idea is related to an important branch of finance
research, which studies how long-term relations between banks and small firms make banks
more willing to incubate small firms. Petersen & Rajan (1995) build models to show that if
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banks have strong market power and can benefit from the growth of small firms, the banks
are more likely to provide loans to these small firms. Empirical results also verify this
finding (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Kranton & Swamy, 1999). In our case, the platform’s
market power and ability to extract rent later depends on its monopoly of big data. Thus,
although the monopoly of big data gives the platform market power, small firms may benefit
from it.
For the second case, we study the impact of a policy that requires the platform to pro-
vide free big data access for banks and discuss optimal policy choices under different condi-
tions. We show that the policy puts banks in a better position to compete with the platform,
and some firms benefit from cheaper loans. However, the platform can no longer extract
rent when small firms grow larger because they can obtain loans from banks. It breaks the
long-term relationship between the platform and firms in its ecosystem and prevents some
firms from obtaining loans when they are small. In this case, the social planner needs to
weigh the trade-off between greater financial inclusion and cheaper loans.
For the third case, an interesting question is: Can the economy itself form a data mar-
ket and conduct data transactions in a decentralized manner? This question is important
because the market may work better than government intervention, and it is not necessary
to have a data open policy. We assume big data cannot be substituted, and the platform
has full market power in the big data market and then characterize the equilibrium when
the platform sells big data to banks. We show that the big data market generates social
surplus and further promotes financial inclusion because the banks have a lower per-unit
funding cost than the platform. However, since the platform has full market power in the
big data market, it reaps all the surplus, and loan prices do not change compared to the case
of private usage of big data.
In the Appendix, we relax our two assumptions: big data is not a complete byprod-
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uct in the platform ecosystem and the platform only has partial market power in the big
data market. We then analyze the impact on our findings. First, to what extent is data a
byproduct of firms’ activities in the platform ecosystem? Although big data is a byproduct
of the firms’ activities, the platform can generate more data by investing in algorithms and
product learning (Che & Hörner, 2018). Second, to what extent can data be substituted?
The platform does not have full market power if big data substitutes are readily available
(Lambrecht & Tucker, 2015; Katz, 2019). We show that our findings are robust after the
assumptions are relaxed.
Our work serves several important functions. First, platforms are critical players in
FinTech. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies FinTech lending
in the platform ecosystem and its impact on financial inclusion and loan prices. We show
that a less efficient banking system gives more room for the platform to use FinTech to
promote financial inclusion. Second, we discuss the impact of a potential data open pol-
icy. We show that although the policy enhances competition in FinTech lending and some
firms benefit from cheaper loans, it may reduce financial inclusion created by FinTech es-
pecially in developing countries with inefficient banking systems and advanced platform
ecosystems. The wrong policy choice may suppress entrepreneurship and innovation in the
platform ecosystem. Therefore, social planners should carefully analyze the situation in
their countries before making a policy choice.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section 3 provides
models to study the impact of a platform’s FinTech lending on financial inclusion and
loan prices when the platform uses big data privately, when the platform provides free big
data access for banks, and when the banks can buy big data in the market. In Section




2.2.1 FinTech and Big Data
Technology makes it possible for FinTech lenders to collect and process big data. For
example, by using machine learning, FinTech lenders can transform soft information into
hard information (Liberti & Petersen, 2019). Since FinTech completely relies on hard
information to screen firms, it centralizes the loan application and processing operations
automatically, which reduces the screening cost of loans without raising the default rate
(Fuster et al., 2019). Giant platforms are key players in FinTech because they owns massive
big data generated in their ecosystems. Stucke & Grunes (2016) use the term "Data-opoly"
to describe a platform’s dominant position in big data and discuss the antitrust concerns.
Although many papers have studied the relation between big data and the market power of
digital platforms, this is the first paper to study the role and impact of big data in FinTech
lending in the platform ecosystem.
2.2.2 Platform Ecosystem and Entrepreneurship
Platforms cocreate value with third-party complementors in their ecosystems (Ceccagnoli
et al., 2012). They invest in small firms in their ecosystems to promote innovation and max-
imize the long-term benefits (Parker et al., 2017; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2018). Since small
firms face significant financial constraints (Holtz-Eakin et al., Summer 1994), FinTech
lending is important because it promotes financial inclusion and stimulates entrepreneur-
ship in platform ecosystems (De Mel et al., 2008). As a result, it promotes economic growth
and employment (De Mel et al., 2008; Glaeser et al., 2015; Decker et al., 2016). Greater
credit supply also promotes firm innovation (Amore et al., 2013; Hombert & Matray, 2017),
and has a greater impact on the innovation of small firms than large firms (Benfratello et al.,
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2008; Nanda & Nicholas, 2014).
2.2.3 Relation Banking
Small firms rely on relationships with banks to obtain loans (Petersen & Rajan, 1994). The
reason is that banks might collect information over time when the firm has a relationship
with small firms. This information is soft information, which is costly and not easily trans-
ferred (Petersen & Rajan, 2002; Liberti & Petersen, 2019). Furthermore, the relationship
relies on the lender’s market power (Petersen & Rajan, 1995). When competition reduces
the market power of lenders, it becomes more difficult for small borrowers to obtain loans
(Kranton & Swamy, 1999). In this research, the relationship between the platform and
small firms also promotes small firm lending. The difference is that the relationship relies
on the platform’s market power in big data which is hard information. Since hard infor-
mation can be easily transferred, it is possible to have a market to trade it. We show that
financial inclusion increases when banks can buy big data from the platform.
2.3 MODEL
We consider an economy in which firms operate in a platform ecosystem and seek loans
either from the platform (FinTech lender) or from a competitive banking sector. We abstract
the life cycle of a representative firm into two periods. The firm starts with a small size
s = s1 in period 1 and has to obtain a loan that is equal to its size at the beginning of each
period to operate. When funded, the firm generates a gross return equal to a times its size
and repays the loan at the end of the period. Denote R as the loan rate the firm may take.
The net profit of an operating firm with size s is as−Rs. Thus, a firm takes the loan and
operates if R ≤ a. The firm grows to size s = s2 in period 2, where s2 > s1. Similarly, the
firm takes the loan and operates at the beginning of period 2 if R ≤ a.
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The platform and banks are lenders in this economy. The loan cost involves two types
of cost: funding cost and fixed lending cost. The per-unit funding cost of banks is r, while
the per-unit funding cost of the platform is high which is r + δ. The total funding cost is
proportional to the size of the loan. δ measures banks’ advantage in raising funds. The fixed
lending cost cb measures the banks’ information cost of screening firms. We assume that the
lender needs a certain amount of information to achieve a low default rate. When the lender
has less hard information, it needs to try harder to to collect soft information. Therefore,
in developing countries that lack a well-developed social credit and banking system, banks
need to work harder to collect soft information. Thus, cb is higher in developing countries.
The key assumption of the model is that the platform monopolizes big data generated by
firms’ activities in its ecosystem. The platform can develop FinTech based on big data and
lower the information cost. Thus, its fixed lending cost cp is lower than cb. Similarly, cp
is lower when the value of big data is higher. We further assume that a,r,δ are exogenous
and stable in the economy and consider a,r,δ as constants in the following analyses.
The total lending cost is the sum of the total funding cost and fixed lending cost. Given
the lending cost, competitive banks provide a loan at the rate Rb(s) such that their lending
profit is zero in each period. Meanwhile, the platform sets the loan at the rate Rp(s) to
maximize its two-period profit. For simplicity, we assume that there is no discount across
the two periods. FinTech makes it possible for the platform to compete with banks in the
lending market even if its per-unit funding cost is higher. Furthermore, our model captures
the well-documented fact that it is difficult for small firms to obtain external funding, and
the platform can lend to small firms due to the lower fixed lending cost.
In the following section, we first study the case when the platform uses big data pri-
vately. We then analyze the impact of a policy that requires the platform to provide free big
data access for banks. Finally, we characterize the equilibrium when the platform can sell
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big data to banks.





Figure 2.1: Private Usage of Big Data
2.3.1 Private Usage of Big Data
First, we consider the case when the platform monopolizes big data and uses it privately.
Since banks are competitive, they provide loans at a competitive loan rate of Rb to make





where s is the size of the firm.
The platform provides a loan at the rate Rp(s), and we denote R̄p(s) as the break-even
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loan rate so that the platform makes zero profit from the loan. We have




If the firm size is too small, the loan rate may be higher than a, which is the highest
level the firm is willing to pay.
Assumption 1 We assume that the firm is too small to afford a loan from banks in period
1, while it can afford it in period 2, i.e., Rb(s1) > a and Rb(s2) < a.
Assumption 1 is equivalent to s1 < c
b
a−r < s2. It allows us to analyze how the platform
uses FinTech to solve small firms’ financial constraints in period 1. Figure 2.1 shows
curves of the loan rate of the platform and banks. If the platform does not develop FinTech
lending, firms distributed on line OC in Figure 1 face financial constraints. In the following,
we discuss two cases in which FinTech can solve small firms’ financial constraints.
Case P - A The platform makes a positive profit if it lends to the firm in period 1, i.e.
R̄p(s1) < a or equivalently c
p







This range corresponds to line BC in Figure 2.1. Since banks do not lend to the firm
in period 1, the platform charges the firm the highest affordable loan rate Rp(s1) = a. In
period 2, both the platform and banks can lend to the firm with a non-negative profit. The
platform lends to the firm if its breakeven loan rate is lower than the banks’ loan rate, i.e.





Otherwise the platform does not lend to the firm in period 2. To maximize the profit, the
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platform provides a loan at a rate that is equal to the rate provided by banks in period 2, i.e.
Rp(s2) = Rb(s2) = r+ c
b
s2
. Thus, the firm takes the loan at the rate a from the platform in
period 1, and at the rate r+ c
b
s2
from the platform in period 2.
Case P - B The platform can subsidize the firm when it is small and maximize the two-
period profit. Thus, the firm may obtain loans from the platform through a long-term
relationship, which further promotes financial inclusion and stimulates entrepreneurship in
the platform ecosystem. In this case, the platform makes a negative profit in period 1, but a
positive two-period profit. Thus, we need R̄p(s1)> a, R̄p(s2)< Rb(s2), and the two-period
profit ΠpP−B > 0, where
ΠpP−B = R
p(s1)s1 +Rp(s2)s2 − (r+ δ)(s1 + s2)−2cp
= (a− r−δ)s1 −δs2 + cb −2cp.
Combining R̄p(s1) > a and Π
p
P−B > 0, we have













The range of s1 corresponds to line AB in Figure 2.1, and the range of s2 corresponds
to line CD in Figure 2.1. Similarly, the firm takes the loan at the rate a from the platform
in period 1, and at the rate r+ c
b
s2
from the platform in period 2.
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Financial Inclusion In sum, the platform lends to the firm in period 1 in two cases: (1)
it makes a positive profit in period 1 or (2) it makes a negative profit in period 1 but a
positive two-period profit. Combining two cases, FinTech solves financial constraints of
firms whose size is:
s1 ∈ [






The range of s1 corresponds to line AC in Figure 2.1. We assume that s is drawn from a
uniform distribution over the support [0, s̄], where s̄ is much larger s1 and s2. This implies
that the number of firms that obtain loans from the platform is proportional to the range of
s1. Thus, the range of s1 measures the financial inclusion created by FinTech.
How do cb and cp affect financial inclusion? First, the lower bound of s1 decreases with
cb and the upper bound of s1 increases with cb 2. It implies that a less efficient banking
system simultaneously expands the lower and upper bounds of financial inclusion created
by FinTech. Second, the lower bound of s1 increases with cp. Thus, when the data value is
higher, FinTech expands the lower bound of financial inclusion in the platform ecosystem.
Our analysis explains why platforms in China have developed leading FinTech and issued
huge FinTech loans, while platforms in the U.S. have not. Although both the U.S. and
China have strong platform economies which implies a low cp, China has a higher cb than
the U.S. because the U.S. has a better banking system than China. As we show in Figure
2.4, when cb increases, financial inclusion created by FinTech increases.
2We consider s2 as a constant, so the firm growth rate is a constant. In the Appendix, we relax this
assumption and discuss whether the firm growth rate affects our findings. We show that our findings are








Figure 2.2: The Impact of cb on Financial Inclusion








Due to FinTech lending, the firm’s welfare improves because it obtains a loan in period
1, and its two-period profit is positive. The increase in firm welfare due to FinTech is equal
to its two-period profit:
Π fP = (a− r)s2 − c
b.
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It is worth noting that the increase in firm welfare is not affected by FinTech but only by
the efficiency of the banking system. In the following, we use Π fP as the benchmark of the
increase in firm welfare and compare it with those in other cases.
Proposition 2.1 The platform can issue FinTech loans to more firms in its ecosystem when
the banking system is less efficient.
Proposition 2.2 Small firms’ welfare increases due to FinTech lending, but the increase in
firm welfare is only related to the efficiency of the banking system.
2.3.2 Free Access of Big Data for Banks
The big data reduces the fixed lending cost, and it may be socially beneficial to require
the platform to open big data to banks. However, since the platform has a higher funding
cost, it cannot compete with banks anymore when banks also have big data. Thus, the firms
can only obtain loans from banks in both periods. When small firms rely on a long-term
relationship with the platform to obtain loans, big data open policy may break the long-term
relationship and prevent small firms from obtaining loans. Therefore, although loan prices
decrease, financial inclusion might also decrease. We analyze the impact of the policy on
financial inclusion and loan prices in the following two cases.
Case F - A When banks have free access to big data, they become FinTech lenders and
their fixed lending cost is cp. They provide a loan to the firm in period 1 when they can
make a positive profit, i.e. (a− r)s1−cp > 0 or s1 > c
p
a−r . The FinTech lenders solve finan-
cial constraints of firms distributed on line A
′













Figure 2.3: Case A of Free Access of Big Data for Banks
If point A
′
is to the left of point A, the range A
′








(a− r)(cb −δs2) < (a− r+ δ)cp.
In this case, the social planner would prefer a data open policy because financial inclusion
increases, and the loan prices decrease.
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Compared to the case of private usage of big data, the financial inclusion increases because





2cp − cb + δs2
a− r−δ
].











The firm’s two-period profit increases.
Π fF−A = (a− r)(s1 + s2)−2c
p
= Π fP +(a− r)s1 − c
p︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
+cb − cp︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
.









(a− r)(cb −δs2) > (a− r+ δ)cp.
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Figure 2.4: Case B of Free Access of Big Data for Banks
In this case, although loan prices decrease, financial inclusion also decreases. Thus, the
social planner needs to weigh the trade-off between the reduced financial inclusion and
reduced loan prices.
Financial Inclusion The data open policy prevents some small firms from obtaining
loans, so the financial inclusion decreases. Compared to the case of private usage of big
data, firms in the following range can no longer obtain loans.
s1 ∈ [







Loan Prices Loan prices are the same as those in Case F-A, so the firm’s profit is also
the same as in Case F-A.
It is worth noting that the relative size of cb and cp determines whether point A
′
is to the
left or right of point A. A less efficient banking system and a stronger platform ecosystem
make it more likely to achieve Case F-B and vice versa. In Case F-B, the policy choice
depends on whether the social planner puts more weight on financial inclusion or loan
prices.
Proposition 2.3 The big data open policy decreases loan prices, but it may also decrease
financial inclusion. When the banking system is less efficient, the policy is more likely to
decrease financial inclusion.
2.3.3 A Big Data Market
Can the economy itself form a data market where big data is traded in a decentralized
manner? In this section, we characterize the equilibrium when the platform sells big data
to banks. We assume that some banks are willing to buy big data to reduce the fixed
lending cost although they cannot improve their profits because of competition. In such
an equilibrium, some banks (D-bank) buy big data from the platform, while other banks
(N-bank) do not. The D-banks lower their fixed lending cost when they are equipped with
big data but have to pay a data fee.
Since banks have a funding advantage, it is optimal for the platform to sell big data and
let banks lend to the firm. The big data market is functional only if the D-banks lend to
the firm. However, they may not lend to the firm if it is too small in period 1. Thus, the
platform sells big data in the following two cases. First, if banks lend to the firm in both
periods, the platform sells big data in both periods. Second, if banks only lend to the firm
in period 2, the platform subsidizes the firm in period 1 and sells big data to banks in period
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2.
Case M - A If banks that buy big data can make a positive profit in period 1, i.e., (a−
r)s1 − cp > 0, the banks will buy big data and lend to the firm in both periods. Denote
RbD(s1) as the loan rate provided by D-banks, Π
b
D(s1) as D-banks’ profit, and p(s1) as data
price in period 1. The competition among D-banks pushes the profit to zero:
ΠbD = R
b
D(s1)s1 − (rs1 + cp + p(s1)) = 0.
Since the platform has full market power in the big data market, we have
RbD(s1) = a,
and the data price in period 1, p(s1) is
p(s1) = (a− r)s1 − cp.
In the same vein, denote RbD(s2) as the loan rate provided by D-banks and Π
b
D(s2) as D-
banks’ profit in period 2. To compete with N-banks, they must provide the loan at a lower
rate, i.e., RbD(s2) ≤ r +
cb
s2
. Denote p(s2) as the data price in period 2. The competition
among D-banks pushes the profit to zero:
ΠbD(s2) = R
b
D(s2)s2 − (rs2 + cp + p(s2)) = 0.






and the data price in period 2, p(s2) is
p(s2) = cb − cp.
The platform’s two-period profit from selling big data is:
ΠpM−A = p(s1)+ p(s2)
= (a− r)s1 + cb −2cp
= ΠpP−B + δ(s1 + s2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive
.
Thus, the big data market generates a surplus δ(s1 + s2), which is proportional to banks’
advantage in the per-unit funding cost. The platform reaps all the surplus due to its full





Combining Assumption 1, FinTech solves financial constraints of firms whose size is:








Case M - B If banks that buy big data cannot make a positive profit in period 1, i.e.
(a− r)s1 − cp < 0, banks will only buy big data and lend to the firm in period 2. The big
data price in period 2 is the same as that in Case M-A, i.e.
p(s2) = cb − cp.
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The platform’s two-period profit is:
ΠpM−B = (a− r−δ)s1 − c
p + p(s2)
= (a− r−δ)s1 + cb −2cp
= ΠpP−B + δs2︸︷︷︸
positive
.
Thus, the big data market generates a surplus of δs2 and the platform reaps all the surplus.
The platform reaps all the surplus due to its full market power in the big data market. Let






























To examine the changes in financial inclusion, we compare the lower bound of s1 in Case
F-A and Case M-A, and the lower bound of s1 in Case F-B and Case M-B, respectively.
65










According to Equation 2.2, we have cb > cp. Thus, c
p−cb






































Thus, compared to Cases F-A and F-B, financial inclusion created by FinTech lending
increases when the platform sells big data to banks in a market.








Proposition 2.4 FinTech further promotes financial inclusion in the case of a big data




This research examines how FinTech solves financial constraints of small firms and de-
creases loan prices in the platform ecosystem. We model FinTech as a technology that
reduces the information cost of a loan by substituting hard information for soft informa-
tion. Our model shows that platforms in developing countries with less efficient banking
systems have more room to use FinTech to promote financial inclusion. This illustrates
why platforms in China have issued huge FinTech loans while platforms in the U.S. have
not. We then discuss a potential policy that requires platforms to provide free big data ac-
cess for banks. We show that the policy decreases loan prices by promoting competition in
FinTech lending. However, it may also decrease financial inclusion and it is more likely to
happen in developing countries with less efficient banking systems. These findings indicate
that social planners should carefully analyze their country’s context before making a policy
choice.
There are several directions for future research. First, the openness of big data may
trigger the entry of new platforms. It will enhance the competition of FinTech lending be-
tween platforms. Future research should explore how it affects financial inclusion and loan
prices. Second, the platform considers all of the benefits based on its ecosystem instead of
only on the profit from FinTech lending. Future research can examine a platform’s FinTech
lending by considering the benefit of the entire platform ecosystem.
2.5 APPENDIX
We relax several assumptions and analyze the impact on our findings in the appendix. First,
big data is not a complete byproduct in the platform ecosystem and the platform only has
partial market power in the big data market. Second, the platform does not have full market
power because big data substitutes may be partially available. Third, we consider s2 as an
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variable and examine whether our findings change when the firm growth rate changes. We
show that our findings are robust after the assumptions are relaxed. Proofs appear in the
appendix of chapter 2.
68
CHAPTER 3
Cross-market Acquisition of Giant Platforms
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Most Giant platforms have built their empires through cross-market acquisitions over the
past two decades. For example, Tencent, best known for its instant messaging apps WeChat
and QQ, has completed many cross-market acquisitions. As a result, a powerful platform
group has formed with Tencent as the core and other leading platforms in various indus-
tries gathering around 1. Table 3.1 shows Tencent’s investments in leading platforms of
e-commerce, short-video, real-estate, EV, and music. To improve its market position in ac-
quisitions, Tencent only shares access to its traffic within its platform group and excludes
other platforms. For example, ByteDance, owner of TikTok, recently sued Tencent in China
because Tencent restricts users from sharing Douyin (Chinese version of TikTok) content
on WeChat and QQ. In contrast, Tencent allows users to share the content of Kuaishou
(TikTok’s main competitor) on WeChat and QQ. Tencent’s traffic gives Kuaishou a strong
competitive advantage over Douyin. As we know, ByteDance refused Tencent’s investment
request, while Kuaishou accepted Tencent as a major shareholder.
Although US giant platforms have not adopted a similar strategy to Tencent’s due to
antitrust regulations, they may have hidden advantages in controlling their own traffic. For
example, Amazon favors sellers who use its fulfillment service in search ranking, and Mi-
crosoft favors its own service with API access. Thus, when giant platforms enter the start-
up’s market, the start-up may find it difficult to compete with them, and being acquired by
giant platforms may be the best strategy for the start-up. For example, if Instagram refused




Table 3.1: The Investment of Tencent in Leading Platforms
Platform Market Value (USD) Industry Shareholding Ratio Ranking of
Shareholding Ratio
Meituan $ 270 Billion E-commerce 20% 1
PDD $ 215 Billion E-commerce 16.6% 2
Kuaishou $ 170 Billion Short-video 21.5% 1
JD $ 149 Billion E-commerce 17.8% 1
BEKE $ 75.8 Billion Real-estate 12.1% 2
NIO $ 68.1 Billion EV 14.3% 2
BILI $ 47.9 Billion Online Video 13.3% 2
TME $ 46.3 Billion Music 55.6% 1
making it difficult for Instagram to compete with Facebook because Facebook would have
an advantage in the user relationship and user data. US giant platforms including Amazon,
Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft have made nearly 800 acquisitions since 2000.
The number of acquisitions each year is growing in the current mobile era, and most of
these acquisitions are cross-market acquisitions (Parker et al., 2020).
The entry of start-ups into emerging markets are important sources of innovation (Phillips
& Zhdanov, 2013). However, extant research shows that start-ups’ entry may decrease after
the acquisition of giant platforms (Kamepalli et al., 2020). Due to the giant platform’s mas-
sive exclusive traffic, the acquisition could generate strong network effects on the acquired
platform and accelerate the winner-take-all process (Argentesi et al., 2021). Thus, the ac-
quisition could create a so-called kill zone around the industries the giant platform enters.
Furthermore, the giant platform, rather than start-ups, could gain most of the value in an
emerging market. For example, Google bought YouTube for $ 1.65 billion in 2006. The
acquisition helped Google enter the video-sharing platform industry, and YouTube quickly
formed a dominant position in the market after the acquisition. Although the founders of
YouTube received large rewards, they only hold a small piece of YouTube’s current value,
which is about $ 300 billion. The reduced return may further decrease the number of start-
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ups entering emerging markets.
The Digital Markets Act (DMA), proposed by the European Commission recently, is to
prevent the self-preferencing of giant platforms and promote start-ups’ entry. However, an
interesting observation is that the entry of start-ups in the platform industry is very active
in both the US and China, which is inconsistent with the extant research (Kamepalli et al.,
2020). The reason is that the pre-acquisition entry may increase due to the cross-market
acquisition. Phillips & Zhdanov (2013) show that an acquisition increases start-ups’ entry
because the acquisition allows start-ups to realize returns in an alternative way. Letina et al.
(2020) show that start-ups’ entry increases as long as the acquisition improves the entrant’s
market position relative to the incumbent. Therefore, a key question is: What is the impact
of cross-market acquisitions of giant platforms on start-ups’ entry in an emerging
market? The answer to this question also sheds light on the lawsuit between Tencent and
ByteDance and the DMA’s impact on start-ups’ entry. Although a regulatory policy that
prohibits giant platforms from self-preferencing can effectively reduce the advantages of
giant platforms in the cross-market acquisition, can this policy promote start-ups’ entry into
an emerging market?
We develop a theoretical model of competition between the entrant and incumbent with
and without a giant platform acquisition to explore the answer to this question. Our model
shows that the giant platform’s acquisition reduces the post-acquisition entry but may in-
crease the pre-acquisition entry. With the help of the giant platform’s exclusive traffic,
the entrant platform’s disadvantage in network effects relative to the incumbent platform
decreases, which encourages start-ups’ entry before the acquisition. The net effect of the
acquisition on start-ups’ entry is positive when the increase in the pre-acquisition entry is
greater than the decrease in the post-acquisition entry.
We also examine a special case when the cross-market acquisition of a giant platform
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happens in a market where the incumbent platform has achieved a winner-take-all result. In
this monopolistic market, the giant platform and entrant platform form allies and break the
market monopoly. Although the post-acquisition entry of start-ups is still zero, the acquisi-
tion increases the pre-acquisition entry of start-ups. Thus, the net effect of the acquisition
on start-ups’ entry is strictly positive. A famous example is Pinduoduo’s entry into China’s
e-commerce market. After Alibaba had built a dominant position in China’s e-commerce
market for more than a decade, PDD, an innovative start-up platform, entered the market
with Tencent as its most crucial shareholder and ally. Tencent restricted its users from shar-
ing Alibaba’s goods on WeChat and QQ, but allowed its users to share PDD’s goods on
WeChat and QQ. With the help of Tencent’s exclusive traffic, PDD has successfully taken
away a significant market share from Alibaba, and its market value is now one-third that of
Alibaba.
We then discuss three cases in which a giant platform strategically increases its market
position in the acquisition. We analyze how the strategic behavior affects the acquisition’s
net effect on start-ups’ entry and discuss corresponding policy implications. First, when a
giant platform acquires start-ups at the earlier stage of market development, the increase
in the pre-acquisition entry decreases while the decrease in the post-acquisition entry in-
creases. Thus, the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is a decrease. Second,
when a giant platform acquires start-ups in markets with stronger network effects, the in-
crease in the pre-acquisition entry increases while the decrease in the post-acquisition entry
decreases. Thus, the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is an increase. Third,
when a giant platform acquires start-ups related to its core business, the increase in the
pre-acquisition entry increases while the decrease in the post-acquisition entry does not
change. Thus, the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is an increase. In sum,
regulators should be cautious about acquisitions in the first case but encourage acquisitions
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in the second and third cases.
Overall, our findings imply that the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry
depends on the pre-acquisition gain and the post-acquisition loss, and varies with several
factors. Therefore, regulators should analyze the specific situation of each acquisition be-
fore deciding whether to approve the acquisition.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In §2, we review the related literature. In §3, we develop
a model to study start-ups’ entry with and without the acquisition. In §4, we analyze how
giant platforms’ strategic behavior affects start-ups’ entry and discuss corresponding policy
implications. In §5, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings as
well as future research directions.
3.2 RELATED LITERATURE
Two strands of literature shed light on this research.
3.2.1 Entry into Platform-based Markets
Extant research on network markets shows that network effects lead to winner-take-all
results (Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986). High-quality entrants may not be able to compete
with low-quality incumbents with a large user base (Zhu & Iansiti, 2012; Halaburda et al.,
2016; Biglaiser et al., 2019), making it difficult for start-ups to enter into platform-based
markets. Eisenmann et al. (2011) show that a giant platform with a dominant position
in one market can enter another market by bundling new products. They show that the
giant platform harnesses the network effects that previously had protected the incumbent
by sharing its current user base with new products. For example, Microsoft bundles its
Windows Media player with Windows to compete with Real-Networks. This idea is a
special case in our model, equivalent to a platform acquiring a start-up with a very small
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market share. If the start-up has a significant market share, the acquisition can reduce the
entry barrier of the giant platform compared to when the giant platform enters emerging
markets through platform envelopment.
3.2.2 Antitrust Policies Related to Platform Acquisitions
Acquisition policies designed for one-sided markets may not be suitable for two-sided
markets, so designing customized antitrust policies for platform acquisitions has become
increasingly important. For example, acquisitions raise market concentration and could
harm consumer welfare, but platform acquisitions resulting in greater concentration may
not necessarily increase prices for either side of the market (Chandra & Collard-Wexler,
2009). Besides the price, another important concern of platform acquisitions is that it could
reduce start-ups’ entry, which is an important source of innovation (Phillips & Zhdanov,
2013). Kamepalli et al. (2020) show that start-ups entry decreases after the acquisition of
giant platforms because small firms find it difficult to compete with giant platforms. How-
ever, the acquisition may also increase start-ups’ entry before the acquisition by improving
start-ups’ market position and rising the start-ups’ return (Phillips & Zhdanov, 2013; Letina
et al., 2020). In this research, we study the acquisition’s impact on start-ups’ entry before
and after the acquisition and discuss conditions under which the acquisition’s net effect on
start-ups’ entry is positive.
3.3 THE MODEL
We develop a model to study the impact of a giant platform’s acquisition on start-ups’ entry
before and after the acquisition. In our model, two start-up platforms, an incumbent I and
an entrant E, compete in the emerging market. We use Q j and n j, respectively, to denote
the platform quality and user base associated with platform j. We assume that the platform
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I has an advantage over the platform E in terms of user base, i.e., nI > nE .
A giant platform G enters the emerging market through a cross-market acquisition. The
advantage of the giant platform is its large user base, while the advantage of platforms I
and E is platform quality because of their innovative product, i.e., QE > QG, QI > QG, and
nG > nI > nE . We assume the platform G’s user base is equal to the total internet user base,
and the platform G can share traffic with other platforms exclusively. Thus, the platform
G can enhance the acquired platform’s network effects by sharing exclusive traffic with it,
making the acquisition a critical factor in start-ups’ success, especially in the early stage of
start-ups. Table 3.2 provides a summary of all variable definitions used in our model.
Table 3.2: Variable Definitions
Factor Definition
e The strength of network effects
E The entrant platform
I The incumbent platform
n j The user base of the platform j
n∗I The user base of the platform I when the acquisition happens
nI the user base of platform I when the pre-acquisition entry starts to increase
N The user base of the platform I when it achieves the winner-take-all result
Q j The quality of platform j
Q̄ The maximum quality of the platform E
Q The minimum quality requirement of the platform E for a successful entry
Q∗ The minimum quality requirement of the platform GE for a successful entry
r The conversion rate of platform G’s user base when it shares users with start-ups
s The entry scale of start-ups on each nI without an acquisition
s1 The increase in the entry scale of start-ups on each nI before an acquisition
s2 The decrease in the entry scale of start-ups on each nI after an acquisition
S The total entry scale of start-ups without an acquisition
S1 The increase in the pre-acquisition entry scale of start-ups
S2 The decrease in the post-acquisition entry scale of start-ups
u j The utility of the representative user adopting platform j
∆ The net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry
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3.3.1 Start-ups’ Entry Without An Acquisition
The platform E competes with platform I in the market. If platform E wins in the current
period, it can enter the market successfully. If it loses the competition in the current period,
it will continue to lose the competition in future periods because the platform I attracts
additional users in the current period and will have stronger network effects in the future
competition. Thus, a successful entry of platform E is equal to winning the competition in
the current period. We do not consider the strategic pricing behavior of platforms which has
been well studied in extant research (Fudenberg & Tirole, 2000; Cabral, 2011; Halaburda
et al., 2016). Instead, we assume platforms make the price equal to the marginal cost,
which is zero. Thus, we focus on studying how the incumbent’s advantage in network
effects affects start-ups’ entry, and two components determine the user’s utility (Liebowitz
& Margolis, 1998): (1) platform quality, which can be affected by product innovation; and
(2) network effects, which are measured by the user base of each platform. The utility of
the representative user adopting platform j, u j is
lnu j = lnQ j + e lnn j
Thus, the utility of the representative user adopting platform I, uI is
lnuI = lnQI + e lnnI
The utility of the representative user adopting platform E, uE is
lnuE = lnQE + e lnnE
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If the entrant can win the competition with the incumbent, we need
lnuE > lnuI ,
or equivalently








We use Q and NE, respectively, to denote the quality ratio of platforms E and I and the










Q measures the advantage of platform E relative to platform I in quality, while NE mea-
sures the advantage of platform I relative to platform E in network effects. When Q > NE,
the platform E enters the market successfully.
Proposition 3.1 The entrant platform enters the market successfully when its relative ad-
vantage in quality is greater than the incumbent platform’s relative advantage in network
effects.
We assume lnQE is drawn from a uniform distribution over the support [0, ln Q̄]. We
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use Q to denote the minimum quality requirement for a successful entry, and we have
lnQ = lnQI − e lnnE + e lnnI
Given QI and nE , a successful entry requires a higher Q when nI increases. A higher Q
implies a higher entry barrier. Thus, start-ups’ entry decreases when nI increases. On each
nI , we use s to denote the entry scale of start-ups and normalize the total potential entry




Figure 3.1: Entry Scale in Platform-based Markets.
We use N to denote the minimum user base requirement of platform I to achieve a
winner-take-all result, and we have









s d lnnI (3.1)
Proof. The integral appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
3.3.2 Start-ups’ Entry With An Acquisition
The platform G enters the market by acquiring platform E and form a new platform GE.
The platform GEs user base, nGE is
nGE = nE + rnG,
where r is the conversion rate when platform G shares its user base with platform E and
r ∈ [0,1]. Since we assume that the quality of platform E is higher than that of platform G,
the quality of platform GE is determined by the quality of platform E. Thus, the utility of
the representative customer adopting platform GE, uGE is
lnuGE = lnQE + e lnnGE
= lnQE + e ln(nE + rnG)
When uGE > uI , users choose to join platform GE, and we have

















Given QI , nE , and nG, a successful entry requires a lower Q, which implies a lower entry
barrier. Thus, with the help of platform G’s exclusive traffic, start-ups’ entry increases
before the acquisition. However, the platform G’s entry accelerates the winner-take-all
process because there are no new users in the market, making it difficult for new start-ups
to enter the market. To simplify the model, we assume that start-ups’ entry decreases to
zero after the acquisition.
Figure 3.2: How the Acquisition Affects the Entry Scale.
We use S1 and S2, respectively, to denote the increase in the pre-acquisition entry and
the decrease in the post-acquisition entry. If S1 is greater than S2, the net effect of the
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acquisition on start-ups’ entry is positive and vice versa. In Figure 3.2, S1 and S2, respec-
tively, correspond to the shaded area before the acquisition and the shaded area after the
acquisition. We use n∗I to denote the platform I’s user base when the platform G makes the
acquisition. Here, we consider n∗I as an exogenous variable, but it is interesting to study
how the optimal n∗I is determined in future research. We use Q
∗ to denote the minimum
quality requirement for the successful entry of platform E with the help of platform G’s
exclusive traffic, and lnQ∗ is
lnQ∗ = lnQI − e ln(nE + rnG)+ e lnn∗I
We use nI to denote the user base of platform I when the pre-acquisition entry starts to





Proof. The proof appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
Similar to Equation 3.1, S1 and S2, respectively, can be written as the integral of s1 with
respect to lnnI on an interval [lnnI , lnn∗I ] and the integral of s2 with respect to lnnI on an








We use ∆ to denote the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry, and ∆ is





s1 d lnnI −
lnN∫
lnn∗I
s2 d lnnI (3.4)
Proof. The integral appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
Proposition 3.2 When the increase in the pre-acquisition entry is greater than the decrease
in the post-acquisition entry, the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is positive,
and vice versa.
3.4 STRATEGIC ACQUISITIONS OF THE GIANT PLATFORM
The platform G can strategically manipulate n∗I , e, and r to improve its market position in
the acquisition. To manipulate n∗I , the platform G can choose to make the acquisition in an
earlier stage of market development. To manipulate e, the platform G can choose to acquire
start-ups in markets where network effects are stronger. To manipulate r, the platform G
can choose to acquire start-ups related to its core business. We separately analyze how the
strategic behaviors of platform G affect the acquisition’s net effect on start-ups’ entry, then
discuss corresponding policy implications.
3.4.1 Manipulation of n∗I
The platform G can choose to make the acquisition in an earlier stage of market devel-
opment. We assume that n∗I decreases to δn∗I (δ < 1). In Figure 3.3, S1 decreases and S2
increases, i.e., the increase in the pre-acquisition entry decreases and the decrease in the
post-acquisition entry increases. Thus, the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry
is a decrease when n∗I decreases. We use ∆
n∗I and S3, respectively, to denote the net effect of
the acquisition on start-ups’ entry in this case and the decrease in start-ups’ entry because
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Figure 3.3: Making The Acquisition in An Earlier Stage of Market Devel-
opment




I = S1 −S2 = ∆−S3 < ∆
Or equivalently, we get the partial derivative of ∆ with respect to n∗I to show the relation




Proof. The derivative appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
Proposition 3.3 The acquisition’s net effect on start-ups’ entry decreases when the giant
platform makes the acquisition in an earlier stage of market development.
Discussion For acquisitions in the platform industry, acquired companies are four-years-
old or younger in nearly 60% of cases at the time of the acquisition (Argentesi et al., 2021).
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According to our analysis, acquiring start-ups in an early stage of market development ben-
efits the giant platform but reduce the start-ups’ entry. Thus, regulators should be cautious
about an acquisition when the market development is in its early stage. In contrast, reg-
ulators should encourage the acquisition of start-ups when the market is mature because
the acquisition may increase start-ups’ entry. How to judge whether it is an early stage or
mature stage of market development in the real world? According to our model, when the
start-ups’ entry is still active and the winner-takes-all result is far from being realized, the
market development is in an early stage, and vice versa. In the following, we use an extreme
case to illustrate how the acquisition increases start-ups’ entry and enhance competition by
inverting the winner-take-all result. If platform I is not a start-up but a dominant platform
Figure 3.4: How the Acquisition Invert the Winner-take-all Result.
that has achieved the winner-take-all result in the market, the acquisition of platform G may
invert the winner-take-all result. Figure 3.4 shows the impact of the acquisition on start-
ups’ entry in this case. With the help of platform G’s exclusive traffic, the pre-acquisition
entry increases, but the post-acquisition entry does not decrease. Therefore, the net effect
of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is strictly positive. This special case corresponds to
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the story of PDD and Tencent jointly entering the e-commerce market and successfully
grabbing market share from Alibaba.
3.4.2 Manipulation of e
Figure 3.5: Markets with Stronger Network Effects
The platform G can choose to enter markets where network effects are stronger. We use
∆e to denote the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry in this case. In Figure 3.5,
S1 increases and S2 decreases when e increases. Thus, ∆e increases compared to ∆, i.e.,
∆e > ∆
Or equivalently, we get the partial derivative of ∆ with respect to e to show the relation




Proof. The derivative appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
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Proposition 3.4 The net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry increases when the
giant platform makes the acquisition in markets with stronger network effects, and vice
versa.
Discussion In markets where network effects are stronger, the incumbent platform can
achieve the winner-take-all result faster. Given n∗I , the post-acquisition entry is smaller
when e is larger. Thus, the "kill zone" effect is weakened. Meanwhile, a larger e increases
the value of platform G’s exclusive traffic, which further encourages pre-acquisition entry.
Therefore, regulators should encourage the acquisition of the giant platform in markets
where network effects are strong.
3.4.3 Manipulation of r
Figure 3.6: Making Acquisitions Related to Core Businesses of Giant Plat-
forms
The exclusive traffic of platform GE depends on r and nG. We relax the assumption
that r is exogenous. Now the platform G chooses to focus on acquisitions related to its
core business to increase r. More exclusive traffic of platform GE increases its advantage
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in the competition with platform I. We use ∆r to denote the net effect of the acquisition on
start-ups’ entry when when r increases. In Figure 3.6, S1 increases and S2 does not change
when r increases. Thus, ∆r increases compared to ∆, i.e.,
∆r > ∆
Since S2 does not change, we only need to analyze how the increase in r affects S1. We get




Proof. The derivative appears in the appendix of chapter 3.
Proposition 3.5 The acquisition’s net effect on start-ups’ entry increases when the giant
platform focuses on acquisitions related to its core business.
Discussion The giant platform may not be able to enter markets that are not relevant
to its core business because it may not control enough exclusive traffic. The exclusive
traffic depends on r and nG. When the regulation is strong, the platform G may have less
exclusive traffic, i.e., a smaller nG. In this case, the giant platform may choose to focus on
acquisitions related to its core business. This finding is consistent with the observation that
US giant platforms acquired platforms more related to their core businesses while Chinese
giant platforms acquired platforms less related to their core businesses because US giant
platforms have less exclusive traffic than Chinese giant platforms due to regulation policies.
Note that the advantage of the giant platform in exclusive traffic may also affect the tar-
get company in the acquisition. In two cases, the platform G enters the market by acquiring
platform I and form platform GI. First, even with the help of platform G, the platform E
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cannot always successfully enter the market. According to Equation 3.2, the platform E
cannot enter the market successfully when
lnQI − e ln(nE + rnG)+ e lnn∗I > ln Q̄ (3.8)
In this case, the only choice of platform G is to acquire platform I to enter the market.
When nG is smaller, the left side of Equation 3.8 is larger. It implies that the platform G
is more likely to acquire the leading platform in the market when it controls less exclusive
traffic. This finding is also consistent with the observation that US giant platforms acquired
more leading platforms in emerging markets than Chinese giant platforms. Second, we use
P(I) and P(E), respectively, to denote the the acquisition price offered by platform G to
platform I and platform E. Similarly, we use V (GI) and V (GE), respectively, to denote the
platform GI’ value and platform GE’s value. The platform G chooses to enter the market
by acquiring platform I when V (GI)−P(I) > V (GE)−P(E). In both cases, the entry
barrier for platform E increases before and after the acquisition because the platform G
becomes the ally of platform I. Thus, both the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition entry
of start-ups decrease, and the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry is strictly
negative. Therefore, a strong regulation policy such as DMA may harm start-ups’ entry
from two aspects: 1) it restricts the giant platform’s ability to help start-ups in markets less
related to its core business. 2) it makes the giant platform acquire leading platforms rather
than start-ups to enter the market.
3.5 CONCLUSION
Giant platforms dominate their own markets and develop large user bases. When they find
valuable emerging markets, they enter markets through acquisitions and grab value because
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they control exclusive traffic. We study the impact of cross-market acquisitions of giant
platforms on start-ups’ entry into emerging markets. We show that the acquisition reduces
the post-acquisition entry but may increase the pre-acquisition entry. The acquisition’s
net effect on start-ups’ entry is positive when the pre-acquisition gain is greater than the
post-acquisition loss. We then discuss three cases in which a giant platform strategically
increases its market position in the acquisition. We show that the acquisition’s net effect
on start-ups’ entry decreases when the giant platform makes the acquisition in an earlier
stage of market development, and increases when the giant platform makes the acquisition
in a market with stronger network effects and more related to its core business. Therefore,
regulators should analyze the specific situation of each acquisition before deciding whether
to approve the acquisition.
The findings of this research suggest several directions for future research. First, we as-
sume that the incumbent platform’s user base is exogenous when the giant platform makes
the acquisition. It would be interesting to consider it as an endogenous variable and study
factors that affect when the giant platform enters the market. Second, several factors affect
start-ups’ entry in our model. It would be worth collecting data to empirically examine




A.1 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 1
A.1.1 Survey Design
We conducted an Amazon MTurk online survey and asked the respondents to code all the
categories on Groupon (a total of 78 categories). The respondents were first asked to review
the definition and examples of "search" and "experience" goods as follows:
In this study, imagine you are browsing a deal website, for example, Groupon.
For some goods, you must see, try or experience them at least once to judge their
quality. For example, you might need to taste the cuisine at a specific restaurant or try a
particular haircut to know if you like the result. These goods are referred to as "experience
goods".
For other goods, you can easily judge their value without having to try them. For
example, one brand of table salt is like any other brand of table salt. And a gallon of regular
gas at one gas station is indistinguishable from a gallon of regular gas at a different gas
station. These goods are referred to as "search goods". You can often evaluate the quality
of search goods simply by reading its product description.
Next, you will be provided with 15 goods and asked to evaluate each of them according
to the extent they are "experience" versus "search" goods.
Please assume that there are no product reviews available.
Out of the 15 questions in the survey, we asked the respondents to access haircut and
gas, both of which are NOT the original Groupon categories. These two products are used
as the filler questions to check whether respondents paid attention in replying.
A total of 818 respondents passed the two attention filler questions) were asked to
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Table A.1: Experience Goods of Amazon MTurk Online Survey
Groupon Category N Mean Median SD Min
Haircut (Attention Checking Question) 818 6.46 7 0.71 5
Hair Salons 175 6.39 7 0.93 2
Facials 159 6.21 7 1.08 1
Makeup Services 195 6.13 6 1.20 1
Spa Treatment 164 6.12 7 1.18 2
Health & Beauty Services 153 6.11 6 1.16 2
Restaurants 133 6.11 6 1.18 1
Dance Classes 122 6.01 7 1.46 1
Massage 145 5.99 7 1.46 1
Wine Tasting 135 5.88 6 1.47 1
Comedy Clubs 127 5.87 6 1.27 2
Personal Trainer 109 5.85 6 1.41 1
Concerts 136 5.77 6 1.70 1
Shows 134 5.74 6 1.45 1
Martial Arts Classes 128 5.73 6 1.48 1
Skin Care 159 5.67 6 1.25 1
Nail Care 140 5.66 6 1.47 1
Chiropractor Classes 132 5.60 6 1.60 1
Photography Service 105 5.54 6 1.62 1
Waxing 157 5.52 6 1.60 1
Teeth Whitening 168 5.51 6 1.50 1
Life Skills Classes 158 5.50 6 1.53 1
Boot Camp 105 5.50 6 1.66 1
Dental Clinic and Dental Care 129 5.48 6 1.53 1
Outdoor Adventures 138 5.47 6 1.88 1
City Tours 148 5.47 6 1.63 1
Fitness Classes 119 5.45 6 1.71 1
Bridal Services 123 5.44 6 1.75 1
Kids Activities: Summer camp, play party 120 5.43 6 1.84 1
Museums 144 5.40 6 1.61 1
Bars & Lounges 149 5.33 6 1.71 1
Tanning 166 5.29 6 1.93 1
Dessert 115 5.28 6 1.84 1
Food: seafood orders, healthy snacks 123 5.18 6 1.79 1
Skiing 144 5.13 6 1.76 1
Yoga 125 5.10 6 1.75 1
Home Services 138 5.09 5 1.65 1
Pilates 119 5.07 6 1.93 1
Skydiving 127 5.02 6 2.16 1
Wine 151 5.01 6 1.91 1
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Table A.2: Search Goods of Amazon MTurk Online Survey
Groupon Category N Mean Median SD Min
Vision and Eye Care 142 4.94 5 1.81 1
Women’s Clothing 136 4.85 5 1.62 1
Travel Packages 125 4.65 5 2.02 1
Gym Membership 114 4.58 5 1.84 1
Men’s Fashion 150 4.53 5 1.83 1
Automotive Services 135 4.50 5 1.89 1
Sweets 133 4.48 5 1.95 1
Home Improvement 123 4.46 5 1.82 1
Women’s Fashion 119 4.40 5 1.99 1
Photo Services 139 4.38 4 1.81 1
Entertainment Goods 153 4.35 4 2.05 1
Coffee & Tea 99 4.32 5 1.91 1
Golf 119 4.28 5 2.05 1
Men’s Clothing 138 4.22 4 1.74 1
Women’s (Clearance Sale) 124 4.14 4 1.96 1
College Test Prep Courses 143 4.11 4 1.85 1
Decor 142 4.08 4 2.14 1
Organic Produce and Food 153 4.07 4 1.98 1
Pet Products and Services 117 4.01 4 1.63 1
Home Theater 138 3.97 4 1.89 1
Personal Electronics 111 3.81 3 1.95 1
Furniture 147 3.79 4 1.91 1
Gadgets 128 3.78 4 1.96 1
Bowling 133 3.75 4 2.00 1
Men’s (Clearance Sale) 148 3.72 4 1.92 1
Women’s Accessories 144 3.65 4 2.01 1
Cameras 115 3.64 4 1.98 1
Men’s Accessories 140 3.43 3 1.66 1
Baby Products: Clothing, Diapers, Monitors 133 3.38 3 1.91 1
Home Goods 138 3.36 3 1.79 1
T-Shirts 144 3.34 3 1.63 1
GPS & Navigation 120 3.21 3 1.78 1
Computers & Hardware 144 3.21 3 1.86 1
Cooking Gadgets 141 3.21 3 1.68 1
Groceries 150 3.07 3 1.69 1
Sports Tickets 141 3.01 2 2.09 1
Holiday Decor 124 2.98 2 1.87 1
Gifts: candles, phone cases, stationary 142 2.60 2 1.68 1
Office Supplies 132 1.98 2 1.34 1
Gas (Attention Checking Question) 818 1.24 1 0.50 1
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imagine that user reviews are not available and assess for each category, to what extent it is
easy(hard) to evaluate the quality without seeing or trying it. The score closer to easy(hard)
corresponds to search (experience) goods. Based on the responses, the goods categories
were coded into two groups: experience goods and search goods. We also used the mean
split and yielded qualitative similar results. The detailed survey responses are presented
below.
A.1.2 Validation Survey
We do a parallel offline survey at a major U.S. university to check the robustness of our
results. Twenty-eight business-school undergraduate students participated in the survey.
Each student was asked to assess the product/service categories on Groupon. They were
asked to code a category as the "search" type (denoted as Ei = 0), if the quality of the
goods or service in that category can be verified through more information searches prior
to consumption (Nelson, 1974). Otherwise, the category c belongs to the "experience" type
(denoted as Ei = 1), if the quality can only be verified during consumption. Across all
respondents, the Fleiss’ Kappa is 0.603, indicating a moderate level of average inter-coder
reliability (Fleiss, 1971). For each category, we used the median split and classified the
category as the experience type if more than half of the respondents coded the category as
the experience type.
Based on the survey, we re-estimate the customer-side model for search and experience
goods, respectively, and present the results in Table A.3. Similarly, the estimates for the
merchant-side model for search and experience goods are presented in Table A.4. Our main
conclusions hold in this validation survey.
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Table A.3: Parameter Estimates for Customer-Side Model
Experience Goods FE DGMM
Est (SE) Est (SE)
Lagged customer base (β1) 0.030** (0.013) 0.128*** (0.038)
Merchant base (γ1) 1.238*** (0.029) 1.449*** (0.061)
Deal price (ρ1) -0.241*** (0.015) -0.365*** (0.093)
Rival customer base (θ1n) 0.071*** (0.012) 0.068** (0.018)
Rival merchant base (θ1m) -0.012 (0.034) -0.053 (0.050)
Returning merchants -0.453*** (0.073) -0.570*** (0.181)
Deal duration 0.109*** (0.010) 0.118*** (0.022)
Week -0.007*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001)
Week-square 1.9E-5 (4.2E-5) 6.5E-5 (5.6E-5)
Sample size 5,354 5,242
R-square 0.737
Number of instruments 110
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(101) = 101.71, p = 0.461
Difference-in-Hansen test for customer base χ2(50) = 14.02, p > 0.999
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(9) = 1.11, p = 0.999
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 12.17, p > 0.999
Search Goods FE DGMM
Est (SE) Est (SE)
Lagged customer base (β1) -0.019 (0.013) -0.018 (0.029)
Merchant base (γ1) 2.099*** (0.044) 2.077*** (0.136)
Deal price (ρ1) -0.706*** (0.025) -0.694*** (0.153)
Rival customer base (θ1n) -0.018 (0.027) -0.004 (0.057)
Rival merchant base (θ1m) -0.041 (0.076) -0.084 (0.156)
Returning merchants -0.163** (0.08) 0.063 (0.397)
Deal duration -0.032** (0.015) -0.030 (0.031)
Week -0.012*** (0.002) -0.015** (0.007)
Week-square -2.8E-4*** (9.5E-5) -1.8E-4 (2.7E-4)
Sample size 3,662 3,213
R-square 0.551
Number of instruments 110
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(101) = 91.85, p = 0.731
Difference-in-Hansen test for customer base χ2(50) = 23.3, p > 0.999
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(9) = 6.15, p = 0.725
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 32.25, p = 0.981
FE is the fixed-effect estimator and DGMM is the first-difference GMM estimator.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table A.4: Parameter Estimates for Merchant-Side Model
Experience Goods FE DGMM
Est SE Est SE
Lagged merchant base (β2) 0.182*** (0.016) 0.398*** (0.056)
Customer base (γ2) 0.278*** (0.006) 0.420*** (0.019)
Deal price (ρ2) 0.099*** (0.007) 0.360*** (0.048)
Rival customer base (θ2n) 0.013** (0.006) -0.028*** (0.010)
Rival merchant base (θ2m) 0.158*** (0.016) 0.149*** (0.027)
Returning merchants 0.149** (0.036) 0.236*** (0.064)
Week 0.004*** (0.0004) 0.001*** (0.001)
Week-square -8.3E-5*** (2.0E-5) -8.3E-5 (2.0E-5)
Sample size 5,354 5,242
R-square 0.882
Number of instruments 111
Hansen test of overidentification χ2(103) = 106.05, p = 0.399
Difference-in-Hansen test for customer base χ2(10) = 2.34, p = 0.993
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(50) = 14.77, p > 0.999
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 9.65, p > 0.999
Search Goods FE DGMM
Est SE Est SE
Lagged merchant base (β2) 0.025 (0.017) 0.192*** (0.061)
Customer base (γ2) 0.275*** (0.006) 0.369*** (0.019)
Deal price (ρ2) 0.263*** (0.01) 0.362*** (0.058)
Rival customer base (θ2n) 0.037*** (0.01) 0.031* (0.015)
Rival merchant base (θ2m) 0.065** (0.029) 0.024 (0.045)
Returning merchants 0.081** (0.036) 0.078 (0.057)
Week 0.010*** (0.001) 0.006* (0.003)
Week-square 3.8E-4*** (3.8E-5) 7.0E-5 (1.3E-4)
Sample size 3,662 3,213
R-square 0.833
Number of instruments 111
Hansen test χ2(103) = 92.88, p = 0.753
Difference-in-Hansen test for customer base χ2(10) = 2.34, p = 0.993
Difference-in-Hansen test for merchant base χ2(50) = 14.77, p > 0.999
Difference-in-Hansen test for price χ2(51) = 25.33, p = 0.999
FE is the fixed-effect estimator and DGMM is the first-difference GMM estimator.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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A.2 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 2
A.2.1 Impact of Data Characteristics
We relax two assumptions of data characteristics and show that they do not affect our
findings in Section 3. First, we assume that big data is a complete byproduct of firms’
activities in the platform ecosystem. Thus, data generation is not affected by a data open
policy. Here we relax this assumption and assume that the platform can try to generate
more big data. In this case, if the platform is required to give banks free access to big
data, it will reduce the platform’s effort to generate big data. Second, we assume that the
platform only has partial market power in the big data market because banks may buy big
data from other sources, which would weaken the platform’s ability to negotiate data prices
in the big data market. In the following sections, we analyze the impact of FinTech lending
in the three cases in Section 3 based on these new assumptions.
A.2.1.1 Private Usage of Big Data
We denote e as the extra resources invested by the platform in big data generation, d as the
total amount of big data generated, and d̄ ≤ d as big data automatically generated without
any additional resources. We assume e is a quadratic function of d − d̄, which represents
the increasing cost of big data generation. β measures the cost of big data generation.
e = f (d) = β(d − d̄)2,
We assume that the platform’s initial level of fixed lending cost is the same as the banks’
cost. The big data reduces the fixed lending cost of the platform from the initial level cb to
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c(d), where α measures the value of big data.
c(d) = cb −αd.
The platform’s two-period profit is:
ΠpP−B = (a− r−δ)s1 − c(d)−δs2 + c
b − c(d)− e
= (a− r−δ)s1 − cb + 2αd −δs2 −β(d − d̄)2.
The first-order condition is:
∂ΠpP−B
∂d
= 2α−2β(d − d̄).
The optimal level of big data generation is:




Financial Inclusion FinTech solves financial constraints of firms whose size is:
s1 ∈ [








It requires a > r+δ+ c(d)s1 , where c(d) = c
b − d̄− αβ . Otherwise, FinTech cannot promote
financial inclusion.
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The firm’s two-period profit is:
Π fP = (a− r)s2 − c
b.
A.2.1.2 Free Big Data Accessible to Banks
If the firm obtains loans from banks in both periods, the platform has no incentive to gener-
ate additional big data. Thus, d = d̄ and banks that are equipped with big data have a fixed
lending cost cb −αd̄. The analysis is similar to the analysis in Section 3.2 and we only use
cb −αd̄ instead of cb. However, the decreased big data makes it more likely to achieve the
Case F-B.
A.2.1.3 A Data Market
In this section, we make a further extension: the platform does not have full market power
when it negotiates the data fee with banks. We assume that the platform can share 0< γ< 1
of the surplus resulting from the reduced fixed lending cost. γ = 1 is the case when the
platform has full market power in the big data market.
Case M - A When banks buy big data in both periods, the platform sells big data in both
periods at the following prices:
pB(s1) = γ[(a− r)s1 − c(d)],
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pB(s2) = γ(cb − c(d)).
The total profit of the platform is:
ΠpM−A = γ[(a− r)s1 − c
b + 2αd]−β(d − d̄)2.
The optimal level of data production is:




The total profit of the firm is:
Π fM−A = (1− γ)[(a− r)s1 − c(d)]+ (a− r)s2 − c
b +(1− γ)αd
= (1− γ)[(a− r)s1 − cb +α(d̄ +
γα
β




= Π fP +(1− γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
positive





Case M - B When banks only buy big data in period 2, the platform sells big data in
period 2 at price:
p(s2) = γ(cb − c(d)).
The total profit of the platform is:
ΠpM−B = (a− r−δ)s1 − c
b +(1+ γ)αd −β(d − d̄)2
The optimal level of data production is:





The firm’s profit is:
Π fM−B = (a− r)s2 − c
b +(1− γ)α(d̄ + (1+ γ)α
2β
)






Financial inclusion Financial inclusion further increases and is negatively related to mar-
ket power. The reason is that the market power in big data increases the platform’s effort
to generate big data.
Loan Prices The platform’s market power has two opposite effects on loan prices. On
the one hand, the platform’s higher market power increases its profit from selling big data,
so the platform generates more big data. This leads to lower loan prices and increases
the firm’s profit. On the other hand, the platform’s higher market power reduces the bank’s
ability to negotiate a lower data fee. This increases loan prices and reduces the firm’s profit.
A.2.2 Impact of the Firm Growth Rate
We use g to denote the growth rate of the firm, and g = s2 − s1, g ∈ (0,∞). The variable
pair (s1,g) are jointly uniformly distributed on [0, s̄] and [0, ḡ] where s̄ and ḡ are constants
and much larger than c
b−cp





































Figure A.1: The impact of firm growth rate on financial inclusion
We use S to denote the financial inclusion created by FinTech lending. In Figure A.1, S


















































i.e., the financial inclusion created by FinTech lending increases with cb.
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A.3 APPENDIX OF CHAPTER 3


















2. Equation 3.3 When the user base of platform I is nI , the minimum quality requirement
of platform E to enter the market, lnQ(nI) is
lnQ(nI) = lnQI − e lnnE + e lnnI
Let lnQ(nI) = lnQ
∗, we have





3. Equation 3.4 ∆ measures the net effect of the acquisition on start-ups’ entry, and ∆ is


























− 2e lnnE ln (nE + rnG)
ln Q̄
+
e(ln (nE + rnG))2
2ln Q̄
+























(ln Q̄− lnQI)− e
(
lnn∗I − ln(nE + rnG)
)
ln Q̄
Since ln Q̄ > lnQE , according to Equation 3.2, we have
ln Q̄− lnQI > lnQE − lnQI > e
(






















(lnnE + ln(nE + rnG))2
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According to Equation 3.2, we have
ln Q̄− lnQI > e
(
lnnI − ln(nE + rnG)
)
(A.2)











(lnnE + ln(nE + rnG))2 > 0
If lnnI < ln(nE + rnG), we have
(ln(nE + rnG)+ lnnE)2 > (ln(nE + rnG)− lnnI)2,
























)2 +(lnnE + ln(nE + rnG))2 > 0
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ln(nE + rnG)− lnnE
)
(nE + rnG) ln Q̄
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